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JURISDICTION 
Appellee Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy ("MWDSLS") agrees 
with the jurisdictional statement of Defendant/Appellant Zdenek Sorf ("Sorf). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Sorf identifies two general issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court abused 
its discretion in denying his Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment; and (2) whether 
the district court erred in denying his Motion for Leave to File a Counterclaim. 
MWDSLS does not disagree with Sorf s statement of the issues. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Rule 60fb\ Utah R. Civ. R: 
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;... The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and . . . not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation.... 
Rule 13(d\ Utah R. Civ. P.: 
"Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which either 
matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may, with 
the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental 
pleading." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
MWDSLS is a Utah Local District, a political subdivision of the State of Utah. 
Utah Code Title 17B, Chapter 1 discusses Local Districts, while Utah Code Ann. §§ 17B-
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2a-601 through 608 particularly apply to Metropolitan Water Districts, a subset type of 
Local District. 
MWDSLS provides supplemental, treated, drinking water to its two (2) member 
cities, Salt Lake City and Sandy City. MWDSLS water is critical to the water supply of 
more than its member cities. Salt Lake City Public Utilities is the largest retail drinking 
w7ater provider in the state, serving a large area outside of Salt Lake City boundaries. 
While this matter deals with the Salt Lake Aqueduct ("SLA"), MWDSLS has 
interests in three large water treatment plants, five large water pipelines and five large 
finished water reservoirs. These facilities are tied together and operate in a coordinated 
fashion to provide redundancy, and service to both sides of the Salt Lake Valley. 
The Little Cottonwood Water Treatment Plant ("LCWTP") receives raw water 
from Little Cottonwood Creek, and from the Provo River System via the SLA. The SLA 
is a mostly 69" inside diameter, 72" outside diameter, steel reinforced concrete, "open 
flow," pipe. SLA carries raw water from the toe of Deer Creek Dam at the top of Provo 
Canyon to the LCWTP. 
MWDSLS owns a 2/7^ interest in the Jordan Valley Water Treatment Plant 
("JVWTP") which is supplied with raw water primarily via the Jordan Aqueduct ("JA"), 
which is a pressurized steel pipe that carries water from the Provo River. The recently-
constructed Point of the Mountain Water Treatment Plant ("POMWTP") in Draper is 
served raw water primarily via the Provo Reservoir Canal ("PRC"), which carries water 
from the mouth of Provo Canyon. From the PRC at the point of the mountain, raw water 
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is carried via the raw water portion of Point of the Mountain Aqueduct ("POMA") to 
POMWTP. 
On the finished water side, water can be moved from any of the three treatment 
plants to serve east, west, south and north. The SLA is very much like one leg of a three-
legged stool. SLA carries finished water to storage facilities at the LCWTP site, a 
reservoir at approximately 7400 South, and Terminal Reservoir near the mouth of 
Parley's Canyon. In all, SLA is more than 41 miles in length. The finished water portion 
of JA carries treated water to a large terminal reservoir at approximately 5800 South and 
3800 West, and then to 2100 South. 
From POMWTP, treated water is carried via the finished water portion of POMA, 
a new pressurized steel pipe that reaches to the finished water SLA at the LCWTP. A 
large finished water reservoir is located at the POMWTP site. Finished water can be 
moved through POMA in either direction. POMA is also tied to the finished water 
portion of JA via the 150 South Pipeline. Water can similarly be moved in either 
direction in the 150th South Pipeline. 
The United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation designed and 
constructed the SLA from 1939 to 1942, and from 1946 to 1951 as part of the Provo 
River Project. It is constructed of different classes of pipe, with different maximum and 
minimum load/cover specifications. MWDSLS is making preliminary preparations for 
major rehabilitation or replacement of the SLA in the upcoming decades. 
SLA sits in the SLA corridor which is a mixture of deeded easement, reserved 
easement, and fee lands. The deeded portions were initially acquired by MWDSLS. As 
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< 
those lands and easements were acquired in the late 1940s and early 1950s they were 
transferred to the United States, and MWDSLS was reimbursed. The amounts * 
reimbursed to MWDSLS were added to the total repayment obligation of MWDSLS. 
The United States held title to the SLA and SLA corridor until October 2006 when the 
SLA, SLA corridor and Terminal Reservoir were transferred to MWDSLS, pursuant to 
the 2004 Provo River Project Transfer Act, Pub. Laws 108-382. 
1 
Sorf s home is in Sandy, Utah. The developer of Mr. Sorf s subdivision platted 
the subdivision so that much of what would become Mr. Sorf s backyard was 
encumbered by the previously deeded SLA easement. There MWDSLS holds the i 
perpetual easement "to construct, reconstruct, operate and maintain" the SLA, including 
"appurtenant structures, which latter may be situated above ground surface. . . . " This 
easement was recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder in 1946—decades before 
what would become the Sorf lot was platted. 
Unfortunately, Sorf has recently been installing large-scale improvements (rock 
retaining walls, concrete slabs, water feature), structures (garage, large deck covering, 
large gazebo), and additional fill on the SLA and the SLA corridor easement in his 
backyard, and oddly, in the back half of his neighbor's lot. Such improvements imperil 
the SLA, violate MWDSLS's easement, and are contrary to MWDSLS regulations, state 
"blue stakes" law, and Sandy City ordinance. For more than twenty years, prior to Sorf s 
installation and building, his back yard was appropriately landscaped with grass, some 
flat work, and bushes. His backyard also contained some trees, which were prohibited by 
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United States regulations and policies. United States enforcement was admittedly lax, 
thus one of MWDSLS' motivations for title transfer. 
MWDSLS became aware of Sorf s new installations and buildings upon routine 
inspection of the SLA corridor in spring 2009. It repeatedly approached him to cease his 
violative activities, restore its access to SLA, and remove those improvements which 
violate MWDSLS's easement and regulations. Sorf refused MWDSLS at every turn and 
declined or ignored eveiy effort to assist him in regulatory compliance. MWDSLS 
sought to meet with Sorf on-site repeatedly, sent him three separate written notices which 
included MWDSLS's SLA encroachment regulations, and posted two separate "stop-
work" notices on his property—both of which were torn down. All the while Sorf s work 
continued. 
MWDSLS filed suit against Sorf for injunctive and declaratory relief and 
damages. Sorf was served by a licensed process server on October 28, 2010 at 5:40 p.m. 
with the Summons and Complaint and a letter from MWDSLS's counsel referencing the 
commencement of the lawsuit and requesting a dialogue with him. Sorf did not answer 
the Complaint. On November 22, 2010, Sorf spoke with MWDSLS's counsel, who 
suggested that he call MWDSLS personnel to arrange a discussion. He did not contact 
MWDSLS, nor did he file an answer. On December 1, 2010, MWDSLS moved the 
district court to enter a default judgment, and mailed notice of its request for default 
judgment to Sorf. On December 16, 2010, the district court entered the default judgment. 
The default judgment was personally served on Sorf at his home on December 23, 2010. 
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It was not until January 24, 2011 that Sorf even brought the default judgment to 
his counsel's attention. He moved to set aside the default judgment on January 31, 2011 
alleging mistake and excusable neglect. Despite his involvement as a named party in 28 
separate Utah lawsuits, prior default judgments, and serving as an officer, director and 
agent for purposes of service for five separate Utah corporate entities, Sorf asserts he is 
somehow a neophyte in the most basic ways of the Courts, including service of process 
and the obligation to respond to an action. Sorf s "mistake" was not "genuine," nor was 
his neglect "excusable." The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Sorf 
had failed to demonstrate sufficient mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or excusable neglect 
to justify setting aside the default judgment. 
The district court also correctly found that Sorf did not meet the additional 
"meritorious defense" requirement for setting aside a default. Every one of the defenses 
Sorf asserted in his "[Proposed] Answer" fails as a matter of law, for the following 
reasons: 
1. MWDSLS's easement is recorded, perpetual, and defined by its terms; 
2. MWDSLS's promulgated regulations are supported and authorized by law; 
3. one cannot adversely possess government real property; 
4. there is no such thing as abandonment of a utility easement when the utility 
is still in the ground requiring operation, maintenance, and potential 
relocation or replacement; 
5. any encroaching improvement on a utility easement making utility 
maintenance or use more difficult is violative per se; and 
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6. equitable estoppel cannot be asserted against a governmental entity, 
especially when based only on alleged comments of staff. 
Sorf s "[Proposed] Answer" did not include a counterclaim. Four months after the 
Default Judgment was entered, two and a half months after he offered his "[Proposed] 
Answer," and one month after the court denied his motion to set aside the Default, Sorf 
sought to file a counterclaim. The district court properly denied this request. Over the 
course of many months prior to filing suit, MWDSLS made repeated efforts to protect the 
easement by enforcement of its regulations. Sorf admits that MWDSLS issued a "stop 
work" order to him on August 31, 2010 to halt all his activities. Likewise, Sorf admits he 
received the letter of October 28, 2010 which accompanied MWDSLS's Summons and 
Complaint. These are factual occurrences that gave rise to Sorf s misguided regulatory 
taking counterclaim. Apparently realizing his counterclaim is barred, Sorf tries to tie his 
regulatory taking claim to the default judgment—a judicial act—rather than MWDSLS's 
pre-suit enforcement of its SLA regulations—a regulatory act. 
Despite being well aware of MWDSLS's consistent efforts to make him comply 
with the regulations governing servient owners9 use of the SLA easement, Sorf made no 
timely effort to assert any claim for inverse condemnation. MWDSLS filed its Complaint 
against him in October 2010, but his proposed Answer made no mention of any 
counterclaim, let alone an inverse condemnation counterclaim. At no time during the 
briefing or argument on Sorf s motion to set aside the default did he ever mention a 
counterclaim of any kind. Instead, he waited until after the district court denied his 
motion to set aside the default. It was only at that point, with the case firmly and finally 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
adjudicated by the district court, that he asked to file an inverse condemnation 
counterclaim. The district court correctly denied his request, and this Court should ' 
uphold that denial as correct. 
RESPONSE TO SORPS STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
< 
Sorf s Statement of Material Facts is flawed in many respects. Most significantly, 
many of his supposed fact statements blend improper legal argument with otherwise 
accurate fact statements and incorrect characterizations of those facts. Other fact 
statements make tactical omissions of key details important to understanding why the 
district court granted MWDSLS's Motion for Default Judgment, denied Sorf s Motion to , 
Set Aside Default, and denied his post-judgment motion to assert a counterclaim. 
MWDSLS offers the following additional facts and clarifications to fill out the 
procedural chronology, and ensure this Court sees the whole factual picture. The 
numbered paragraphs presented below do not correspond to the numbered paragraphs in 
Sorf s Appellant's Brief. 
1. MWDSLS's SLA regulations define the parameters of public use and 
occupancy of its fee and easement lands. (Regulations for Non-District Use of Salt Lake 
Aqueduct (R. 21-32) (attached as Add. 1.)) They are promulgated pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. $ 17B-1-103. (R. 10.) 
2. MWDSLS provided these regulations to Sorf along with a form 
Cooperation Agreement for his continued limited use and occupancy of the SLA corridor 
long before MWDSLS filed its Verified Complaint. (MWDSLS's Verified Complaint 
(R.11,133.) 
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3. Disregarding the regulations, Sorf has made significant landscaping 
improvements to his back yard, including earthwork, addition of fill, construction of rock 
retaining walls and fencing, installation of concrete pads and a water feature, and 
construction of a large shed or barn, a gazebo, and a hot tub. (Id. at R. 10-15.) 
4. The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation established maximum and minimum 
load/cover criteria for the several different classes of steel reinforced concrete pipe used 
to construct the SLA. (See id. at 9-11.) 
5. MWDSLS now administers and licenses encroachments on the SLA; 
previously that was the responsibility of the United States. (Id. at R. 8-11.) Unpermitted 
encroachments on the easement present significant concerns with respect to SLA access, 
repair, and replacement. (Id aX 9-10.) 
6. Sorf asserts as a "fact" that MWDSLS has "expanded" the easement, and 
attempts to paint MWDSLS as "unilaterally" creating new rights for itself under the 
easement. See Sorf s Statement of Facts at ^ | 5. These assertions and characterizations of 
MWDSLS's actions and the regulations are improper argument, and Sorf supports them 
simply by citing to the regulations themselves. The regulations were propounded for 
purposes of protecting the SLA and the SLA corridor, not expanding the easement, and 
neither expressly nor impliedly support Sorf s argument that the regulations wrongly 
expanded the easement. 
7. Sorf implies that there was some imperfection in service of the Summons 
and Complaint upon him, stating that they were "left at Mr. Sorf s home, but not 
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personally served on him." (Appellant's Brief at 3.) Sorf omits all details supporting the 
district court's finding that the Summons and Complaint were properly served on him. 
8. The Summons and Complaint were served by a licensed process server at 
5:40 p.m. on October 28, 2010 at Sorf s home to an adult female who answered the door 
and verbally confirmed herself to be his wife. (Process Server Return of Service (R. 79) 
(attached as Add. 2); Declaration of Mel Ashton at ^  3-4 (R. 171) (attached as Add. 3.)) 
9. MWDSLS's process server, Mel Ashton, is certified and licensed by the 
Utah Department of Public Safety. Previously, Mr. Ashton was a Salt Lake City police 
officer for eight years, and then was a US Drug Enforcement Agency officer for twenty 
years. (Ashton Decl. at ^ f 2 (R. 171.)) Mr. Ashton testified under penalty of perjury in 
both his Return of Service and Declaration that he served the Complaint and Summons 
and the letter, which Sorf admits he received, at Sorf s home. (Id. at ^ f 4.) 
10. Mr. Ashton served the Summons and Complaint on an adult woman who 
answered the front door. Mr. Ashton asked this woman "Are you Mrs. Sorf?" to which 
she responded "Yes." (Id.) Apparently this woman, after receiving the documents in-
hand, threw them down. (Id. at ^  5.) 
11. Also on October 28, 2010, Sorf received a letter from MWDSLS that 
referenced the Summons and Complaint. (See October 28, 2011 letter from Shawn 
Draney to Zdenek Sorf (R. 118.)) Sorf claims that the Summons and Complaint were not 
actually enclosed with the letter—an assertion that the district court apparently found 
unpersuasive in light of the service by the Process Server's affidavit. MWDSLS's letter 
to Sorf invited a conversation in hopes of resolving the issues surrounding Sorf s 
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unlicensed and violative improvements and structures on the SLA and in the SLA 
corridor. (Id.) 
12. Sorf asserts that based on his reading of this letter, he believed that 
MWDSLS would refrain from filing a lawsuit if a settlement could be reached. 
(Appellant's Brief Statement of Facts at ^  34). The letter contains no such statements, 
either express or implied. (See October 28, 2011 letter (R. 118.)) In fact, the letter states 
just the opposite as it references the Summons and Complaint that had been filed with the 
Court commencing the lawsuit. (Id.) 
13. Sorf called Shawn Draney, counsel for MWDSLS, on November 22, 2010. 
Sorf claims that his conversation with MWDSLS's counsel gave him the "impression" 
that MWDSLS would only pursue a lawsuit if a settlement could not be reached. 
(Appellant's Brief at 136.) However, the Record contains facts which would support the 
district court's exercise of discretion to disregard Sorf s "impression": Mr. Draney told 
Sorf this was a matter of great concern to MWDSLS, reiterated the importance of the 
SLA and its corridor, and stated concerns that Sorf s landscaping and backyard structures 
might add weight to the pipe that it was not designed to handle. Mr. Draney then 
suggested Sorf call MWDSLS personnel and set up a meeting with them, and told Sorf 
that he was going to proceed with the entry of a default as the time to answer had elapsed. 
Mr. Draney gave Sorf the phone numbers for MWDSLS's General Manager, Mike 
Wilson, and MWDSLS's Engineering Manager, Wayne Winsor. Given the importance 
of this matter and the lack of any correspondence from Sorf, Mr. Draney had his 
paralegal Deb Wharff present in his office during this telephone call. Ms. Wharff 
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immediately memorialized the call in a written memorandum. No one on the call ever 
requested or offered an extension of time for Sorf to file an answer. (Declaration of 
Deborah M. Wharff at ^  7 (R. 179) (attached as Add. 4); "DMW Memo re Call from 
Sorf (R. 208) (attached as Add. 5.)) 
14. Sorf asserts that he called both Mike Wilson and Wayne Winsor, but the 
Record shows that neither Mr. Winsor nor Mr. Wilson ever received a phone call or 
voicemail from Sorf. (Declaration of Michael L. Wilson at ^ f 3 (R. 210-211) (attached as 
Add. 6); Declaration of Wayne Winsor at 13 (R. 213-214) (attached as Add. 7.)) 
15. Further all incoming calls to MWDSLS (whether answered or not) are 
electronically logged. (Declaration of Ryan Nicholes at If 3 (R. 216-223) (attached as 
Add. 8.)) Based on MWDSLS's electronic records of all incoming calls, Sorf never 
called Mr. Wilson or Mr. Winsor. (Id. at ^ | 3-5 and telephone data records attached 
thereto.) 
16. Sorf was repeatedly informed of the lawsuit and the danger of default. In 
addition to MWDSLS's October 28, 2010 service of the Summons and Complaint on 
Sorf, and the November 22, 2010 telephone conversation between Sorf and MWDSLS's 
counsel, he received MWDSLS's Application for Default Judgment in December 2010. 
(Sorf Decl. at ^ f 12 (R. 115.)) The Application for Default Judgment specifically 
referenced the filed Complaint and Summons, the date of service, and Defendant's failure 
to answer. (Application for Default Judgment (R. 82-84) (attached as Add. 9)) 
17. Despite all the notice given to Sorf about MWDSLS's action to protect the 
SLA, he claims to have been completely ignorant of the Summons and Complaint, and 
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the entry of default, until January 24, 2011. (Appellant's Brief at ffl[ 52-53.) Likewise, 
Sorf suggested to the district court that he was legally unsophisticated, and he argued that 
he simply did not understand the importance of filing an answer to a complaint or 
responding to an application for default judgment. (Memo, in Support of M. to Set Aside 
Default Judgment (R. 108, 110.)) 
« 
18. According to records maintained by the Utah Division of Corporations, 
Sorf is an officer, director, secretary, or registered agent for five separate Utah corporate 
entities. (Wharff Decl. at f 6 (R. 176-180) (attached as Add. 4.)) 
19. Prior to this lawsuit, Sorf had been a named party in 28 separate lawsuits in 
the State of Utah alone. A number of these suits ended in entry of default judgment 
against Sorf. {Id at ffif 3-5.) 
20. In Sorf s original motion to set aside the default judgment, he did not 
submit any proposed answer, nor did he mention any counterclaim for inverse 
condemnation. (R. 106-118.) 
21. On February 3, 2011, Sorf supplemented the Motion and Memo to Set 
Aside Default Judgment with a "[Proposed] Answer." (R. 122-134.) 
22. His proposed Answer did not include any counterclaim. {See id.) 
23. The Court heard oral argument on Sorf s Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment on March 8, 2011 and denied the Motion via ruling from the bench. (R. 345.) 
24. Per the Court's request, counsel for MWDSLS prepared a [Proposed] Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment ("Order") and submitted the 
same to Sorf s counsel. (R. 353-355.) 
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25. On March 15, 2010, Sorf filed an Objection to the Order which contested 
the decision of the Court, asserted the Court was in error on a host of legal and factual 
points, and reargued these points. Sorf s objection made no mention of any claim for 
inverse condemnation. (R. 350-352.) 
26. On March 17, 2011, MWDSLS responded to Sorf s Objection to the Order 
noting that it was essentially an effort at reconsideration and was therefore specifically 
disallowed under the Utah Rules as stated in Gillette v. Price. 2006 UT 24. 135 P.3d 861 
27. That same day, the Court signed the [Proposed] Order as submitted by 
MWDSLS. (Order, signed March 17, 2011 (R. 353-55) attached as Add. 10.)) 
28. According to the Order, "[t]he Default Judgment entered December 13, 
2010 by this Court remains in full force and effect." {Id. at *f 2.) 
29. On April 14, 2011, Sorf indicated for the first time that he wished to file a 
counterclaim. (R. 374-402.) 
30. His proposed counterclaim alleged that MWDSLS's regulations effected a 
regulatory taking of his property. (R. 474-481.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sorf s Motion to Set 
Aside the Default Judgment, because Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
does not necessarily require the district court to grant such motions in all cases. In this 
case, the summons and complaint were properly served on Sorf, and he has extensive 
experience with the civil justice system. He was well aware of the consequences of 
failing to answer the complaint. Given these facts, he could not justify setting aside the 
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default judgment on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, and 
setting aside the default judgment would not have been "in furtherance of justice" as Rule 
60(b) requires. 
Moreover, Sorf misinterprets the second prong required for setting aside default 
judgments: the "meritorious defense" requirement. The district court is not required to 
set aside a default judgment if proffered defenses are meritorious; rather, a default 
judgment must not be set aside unless defenses are meritorious. In any event, none of the 
nineteen affirmative defenses he proffered (on appeal he asserts only four) were 
meritorious: 
1. While the scope of MWDSLS' regulatory authority is not restrained by the 
scope of its easement, the regulations do not exceed the scope of the easement; 
2. Sorf cannot adversely possess government land; 
3. Neither the U.S., nor MWDSLS abandoned the SLA easement; and 
4. MWDSLS cannot be equitably estopped from enforcing its regulations. 
The district court correctly denied Sorf s post-judgment Motion for Leave to File a 
Counterclaim, for five main reasons: 
1. Sorf s argument that he could not file his counterclaim until after the 
district court had denied his Motion to Set Aside is not supported by logic, Utah law, or 
takings jurisprudence. Nothing prevented Sorf from filing his counterclaim with his 
proposed Answer. By that time, MWDSLS had taken all acts of enforcement of its SLA 
easement rights and regulations. The district court's judgment was not the regulatory act 
at issue, and could not constitute a taking. 
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2. There was no merit to Sorf s claim that MWDSLS's attempts to protect the 
SLA through enforcement of the easement and the concomitant regulations constituted a 
regulatory taking. MWDSLS has significant latitude to promulgate regulations as 
necessary to protect its facilities and operations. These regulations are entitled to a high 
degree of deference. Lastly, enforcement of MWDSLS's regulations does not destroy all 
economically viable uses of Sorf s whole parcel of property. For more than twenty years, 
Sorf s back yard was enjoyed without things like a large water feature, a large gazebo or 
a large motorcycle barn, which are the items of greatest concern to MWDSLS. 
3. Sorf s Motion for Leave to File a Counterclaim was essentially just a 
second, improper motion to reconsider the district's court denial of his Motion to Set 
Aside the Default Judgment. Such motions are expressly forbidden, and therefore 
properly denied. 
4. Sorf never served a pleading as required under Rule 13(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
5. Sorf did not first reopen the Default Judgment, as required by case law. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING SORF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT. 
Rule 60(b) does not require a district court to set aside a default even if the movant 
shows "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Rather, the court "may" 
set aside a default judgment for these reasons, but only if (a) the motion is timely, and (b) 
the court finds that setting aside the default is "in furtherance of justice." See Rule 60(b), 
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Utah R. Civ. P. The question of what is "in furtherance of justice" obviously implicates 
the court's equitable discretion. In weighing the equities, courts interpreting Rule 60(b) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have asked whether it would be "manifestly 
unconscionable that a judgment be given effect." Atwellv. Equifax, Inc.. 86 F.R.D. 686. 
688 n.2 (D.Md. 1980). Even if the movant satisfies all the requirements of Rule 60(b), 
case law imposes an additional requirement: the movant must show that he "has a 
'meritorious defense' to the action." Hernandez v. Baker, 2004 UT App 462. ^ [3. 104 
P.3d 664 {quoting Erickson v. Schenkers Intl Forwarders, Inc.. 882 P.2d 1147. 1148 
(Utah 1994)). 
The district court's denial of Sorf s motion to set aside the default judgment is 
"largely a discretionary matter," and should be reversed only if it is "clear the court 
abused that discretion." Heath v. Mower. 597 P.2d 855. 858 (Utah 1979) {citing Warren 
v. Dixon Ranch Co.. 260 P.2d 741 (Utah 1953)). "That some basis may exist to set aside 
the default does not require the conclusion that the court abused its discretion in refusing 
to do so when facts and circumstances support the refusal." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92. 
93 (Utah 1986). There are good reasons for this deferential appellate standard of review. 
The district court sits closer to the facts than an appellate court, and is better able to 
evaluate the equitable arguments in favor of setting aside a default: 
In situations where the exercise of discretion is appropriate, considerable 
weight should be given to the determination of the trial court, whichever 
way it goes. This is true because due to his close involvement with the 
parties, the witnesses, and the total circumstances of the case, he is in the 
best position to judge what the interests of justice require in safeguarding 
the rights and interests of all parties concerned. 
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i 
Barber v. Caldei\ 522 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1974) (affirming trial court's entry of default 
judgment); see also, Eagle Associates v. Bank of Montreal 926 F.2d 1305. 1307 (2nd Cir. < 
1991) (finding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to set aside, and 
explaining that "the trial judge, who is usually the person most familiar with the 
circumstances of the case and is in the best position to evaluate the good faith and 
credibility of the parties, is entrusted with the task of balancing these competing 
considerations.") (applying Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
A. The District Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Finding that 
Sorf s Failure to Answer the Verified Complaint Was Not Diie to 
Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise, or Excusable Neglect I 
Sorf argues that the district court failed to consider all of his arguments under Rule 
60(b). Sorf is wrong, because the district court explicitly based its decision both "upon 
the written submissions of the parties and oral argument presented" at the hearing. 
(Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default (R. 353-354.)) Sorf argued in 
his written submissions to the district court (as he is arguing again to this Court) that he { 
met the requirements of Rule 60(b)(1). Specifically, he claimed that he was not served 
with the summons and complaint, and that he mistakenly believed no default would be 
entered against him if he attempted to settle the lawsuit with MWDSLS. {See Sorf s 
Memo, in Sup't of Mot. to Set Aside Default (R. 109-110.)) At the hearing, Sorf s 
counsel again argued for relief under Rule 60(b)(1), but the district court was not 
persuaded, and directed MWDSLS to draft the order denying Sorf s Motion. The Order 
stated: 
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1. Based on the Court's finding that Defendant was properly served 
with the Complaint and Summons, that Defendant has not made an 
adequate showing of excusable neglect, mistake, or inadvertence in his 
failure to respond to the Complaint, and that those defenses proffered by 
Defendant to Plaintiff's Complaint are not meritorious as a matter of law 
under the circumstances given Plaintiffs defined easement, its prior federal 
ownership, and Plaintiffs status as a political subdivision of the state, the 
Court hereby denies Defendant's Motion. 
(Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default (R. 353-354) (emphasis 
added.)) The district court thus duly considered whether Sorf had shown excusable 
neglect, mistake, or inadvertence, and concluded that he had not. 
Sorf objected to the court's Order with what was essentially a request that the 
court reconsider the bases for its ruling. Sorf argued—as he argues again to this Court— 
that the court had "misapprehended" his arguments as to "mistake, inadvertence, and 
excusable neglect." (See Sorf s Objection to Proposed Order (R. 350-351.))1 He did not 
argue that the proposed order did not accurately reflect the bases for the court's decision. 
(See id.) The court disagreed with Sorf s arguments and signed the Order, thereby 
memorializing the bases for its denial of Sorf s motion to set aside the default. "A 
court's interpretation of its own order is reviewed for clear abuse of discretion and we 
afford the district court great deference." Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy. 2008 UT 15, 
1T9. 179P.3d786. 
"[A] party trying to set aside a default judgment must show that he has used due 
diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had 
1
 "Motions to reconsider are not recognized by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." 
Tschaezenv v. Milbanklns. Co., 2007 UT 37. f 15. 163 P.3d 615 (citing Gillettv. Price. 
2006 UT 24. Hf 5. 7-8. 135 P.3d 861) (directing attorneys to "immediately discontinue 
the practice of filing post judgment motions to reconsider."). 
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no control." Heath v. Mower. 597 P.2d 855. 858 (Utah 1979) (internal quotation 
omitted). "Utah precedent clearly establishes that some measure of diligence is necessary 
to constitute excusable neglect. . . . " Cadlerock Joint Venture II LP v. Envelope 
Packazim 0f Utah Inc.. 2011 UT App. 98.1 9. 251 P.3d 837. "[I]f default is issued 
when a party genuinely is mistaken to a point where, absent such mistake, default would 
not have occurred, the equity side of the court. . . [should] grant relief." Lund v. Brown, 
2000 UT 75,110. llP.3d 277 {quoting May v. Thompson. 611 P.2d 1109. 1110 (Utah 
1984)) (emphasis added); see also, Weiss v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.. 283 F.3d 
790. 795 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Where default results from an honest mistake rather than 
willful misconduct, carelessness or negligence there is especial need to apply Rule 60(b) 
liberally." (emphasis added.)) Neglect is only excusable if the movant can show that he 
"used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over 
which he had no control." Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker. 513 P.2d429. 431 
(Utah 1973). Here, Sorf s alleged "mistake" is not "honest" or "genuine" and his neglect 
is not "excusable." Equity should not side with him. 
Sorf claims that he did not receive the summons and complaint that were served 
on him through an adult woman at his house. (Appellant's Brief at 24.) However, he 
never moved for insufficiency of service of process per Rule 12(b)(5). Utah R. Civ. P., 
and thus waived any arguments about the sufficiency of process. See Rule 12(h). Utah R. 
Civ. P.; Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son. 808 P.2d 1061. 1067 (Utah 1991) (waiver of 
defective process defense for failure to initially raise it by motion). 
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The summons and complaint were properly served on Sorf. Mr. Mel Ashton of 
A. A. & Associates, Inc., a licensed process server, swore under the penalty of perjury that 
he served the Summons, Complaint, Exhibits and the October 28, 2010 letter from 
MWDSLS's counsel to Sorf at his home at 5:40 p.m. on October 28, 2010. (See Proof of 
Service (R. 79) (attached as Add. 2); Ashton Decl. at ffij 3-5 (R. 170-172), (attached as 
Add. 3.)) Mr. Ashton served the papers on an adult female who answered the door and 
verbally represented herself to be Sorf s wife. The Utah Court of Appeals provided 
explicit instruction on this point in Cooke v. Cooke, 2001 UT App 110, 22 P.3d 1249: 
This jurisdiction has never addressed whether a presumption of correctness 
applies to a return of service by a private process server. We have held that 
a sheriffs return of service is "'presumptively correct and is prima facie 
evidence of the facts stated therein,'5' but the "'invalidity or absence of 
service of process can be shown by clear and convincing evidence.'" 
Classic Cabinets, 1999 UT App 88 at ^ f 11 (citation omitted). Moreover, 
the person purportedly served has "the burden of showing that service was 
invalid." Skanchv v. Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1074-75 (Utah 
1998). In Classic Cabinets, we extended the presumption of correctness to 
a constable's return of service. See Classic Cabinets, 1999 UT App 88 at % 
11. For the same reasons expressed in Classic Cabinets, we now extend the 
presumption of correctness to a return of service by a private process 
server. See id. at ^  12. All process servers are subject to the same criminal 
charges for falsifying a return of sendee. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12a-4 
(1996). Since all process servers are held equally accountable under the 
law, it follows that their returns of service should be given an equal 
presumption of correctness. Thus, Stubbs's return of service certifying that 
Husband was personally served is presumptively correct and can be 
disproved only by clear and convincing evidence. 
Idat^9. 
It is critical to note that Sorf acknowledges he was served with the October 28, 
2010 letter that, by its terms and under Mr. Ashton's Proof of Service, accompanied the 
Summons and Complaint. (Appellant's Brief at 11, f^ 33.) Furthermore, Mr. Ashton also 
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personally served the signed Default Judgment on Sorf and this same adult female at 
Sorf s home at 1:09 p.m. on December 23, 2010. (See Default Judgment with service i 
notation (R. 100-103) (attached as Add. 11); Ashton Decl. at ffi[ 7-9 (R. 170-172), 
attached as Add. 3.)) 
Between these two service occasions, Sorf received five other documents in this 
case by U.S. Mail. MWDSLS's counsel mailed via U.S. Mail to Sorf s home address: 1) 
I 
the Notice of Filing of Lis Pendens (October 28, 2010) which specifically referenced this 
current and on-going case; 2) the Application for Entry of Default Judgment (December 
1, 2010) which specifically referenced the filing and service of Summons and Complaint; < 
3) the Default Certificate (December 13, 2010) which also specifically referenced the 
Summons and Complaint; 4) the Military Service Affidavit (December 13, 2010); and 5) 
the Military Service Order (December 13, 2010). In sum, Sorf was served twice and was 
mailed five case documents since the inception of the lawsuit. 
Next, Sorf asserts that because MWDSLS's October 28, 2010 letter invited a 
resolution dialogue and he spoke with MWDSLS's counsel about one month later, he 
believed settlement negotiations might forestall the filing of a lawsuit. (Appellant's Brief 
at 11, Iflj 34, 36.) Sorf also represents that he attempted to call Mr. Winsor and Mr. 
Wilson at MWDSLS upon counsel's suggestion. (Id. at 12, «f 38.) These are fictional 
representations for a number of reasons. First, the Summons and Complaint had already 
been personally served at Sorf s home. (See Proof of Service and Ashton Decl.) Second, 
on November 22, 2010, Mr. Draney specifically told Sorf to call Mr. Wilson or Mr. 
Winsor at MWDSLS to discuss this matter but in the meantime, he was moving forward 
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with his application for default judgment as the time to answer the Complaint had passed. 
(Wharff Decl. at f 7 and DMW Memo.) Third, Mr. Winsor and Mr. Wilson have never 
received telephone calls or voicemails from Defendant. (See Wilson Decl. at ^ 3 and 
Winsor Decl. at ^ j 3.) Confirming this, MWDSLS's incoming phone logs demonstrate 
that no incoming phone calls (answered or not) came to MWDSLS from Mr. Sorf s 
telephone numbers from December 3, 2010 forward. (See Nicholes Decl. at ^[ 3-5 and 
MWDSLS telephone data records attached thereto.) 
Sorf claims not to have known about the Summons and Complaint, and the entry 
of default, until January 24, 2011. (See Appellant's Brief at 16, fflf 52-53.) Similarly, he 
suggested to the district court that he was legally unsophisticated, and he argued that he 
simply did not understand the importance of filing an answer to a complaint or 
responding to an application for default judgment. (R. 108-110.) The reality is that Sorf 
is quite experienced in civil litigation. Based on Utah state court records, he has been a 
party to some 28 separate lawsuits. (See Wharff Decl. at ^  3.) He has retained a variety 
of lawyers (including his current counsel Strong & Hanni) on many of these occasions, 
including matters involving failures to appear and default judgments. (Id. at f^ 5.) 
Moreover, he is an officer, director, and/or registered agent for five Utah registered 
corporate entities. (Id. at ^  6.) In other words, sendee of process and default judgments 
are familiar territory for Sorf. There is no "genuine mistake," "due diligence," or 
"excusable neglect" here. There is only a habitual and willful refusal to respond. 
Courts have upheld default judgments against defendants with far better arguments 
for excusable neglect than Sorf can show here. For example in Arbogast Family Trust v. 
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River Crossings, LLC, Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's entry of a default 
judgment rejecting the defendant's assertion of mistake and excusable neglect. The i 
defendant argued that it did not answer the complaint for a number of reasons including 
previous correspondence with plaintiff and counsel, resolution discussions, the 
withdrawal of counsel, and new counsel's vacation. 2008 UT App 277. If^f 25-28. 191 
P.3d 39. The defendant in Arhogast was far more engaged and responsive to the action 
than Sorf has been in this matter, but nevertheless, the Court could not find a "reasonable 
justification or excuse for [Defendant's] failure to answer." Id. at ^  28. 
B. Sorf s Alleged "Meritorious Defenses" Do Not Entitle Him To Have the , 
Default Judgment Set Aside. 
Sorf objects that the district court gave short shrift to his supposedly meritorious 
defenses. However, his Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment did not even mention his arguments on the merits. (See Memo, in Sup't of M. 
to Set Aside Default Judgment (R. 109-111.)) Instead, he simply submitted a proposed 
answer as an after-the-fact "supplement" to his Memorandum. (R. 122-134.) Even 
though Sorf presented essentially no written argument that the defenses in his proposed 
Answer were meritorious, the district court nonetheless considered the defenses and 
expressly found that they were "not meritorious." (Order Denying Def s M. to Set Aside 
Default (R. 353-354.)) 
While Judge Fratto's order indicates that he found Sorf s defenses to be not 
meritorious as a matter of law, Sorf mistakenly argues that the district court subsequently 
"admit[ed] that Mr. Sorf s defenses were never actually considered and no determination 
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as to the merits of the defenses made." (Appellant's Brief at 21; 30.) In reality, the 
court's written Order is accurate, and the court never "admitted" otherwise. Judge Fratto 
clearly stated that he "did, as part of Mr. Belnap's motion to reconsider this, opine in 
terms of the—whether there was a meritorious defense presented" for purposes of a 
motion to set aside a default. (Hearing Transcript (R. 558.)) Analysis of whether 
proffered defenses are "meritorious" as a matter of law for purposes of a motion to set 
aside under Rule 60(b) is crucially different from a ruling on the merits. Judge Fratto did 
not act as fact finder to rule on the merits of Sorf s defense, but he was not supposed to. 
Sorf incorrectly asserts that relief from a default judgment "is warranted when" the 
movant shows a meritorious defense. (Appellant's Brief at 29.) This misconstrues the 
"meritorious defense" requirement. It is not a tool for setting aside defaults, but rather 
another hurdle a defendant must clear to set aside a default and have his defenses 
considered. Simply showing a meritorious defense does not necessarily entitle the 
movant to have the default set aside. Generally, parties in default are "not entitled to be 
heard on the merits of the case." Russell v. MartelL 681 P.2d 1193. 1195 (Utah 1984). 
"[I]t is unnecessary, and moreover inappropriate, to even consider the issue of 
meritorious defenses unless the court is satisfied" that the other requirements of Rule 
60(b) have been established. See State By and Through Utah State Dept. of Social Servs. 
v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053,1056 (Utah 1983). 
As noted above, Rule 60(b) provides that if a movant meets the requirements of 
Rule 60(b), the court "may" set aside the default if necessary to serve the interests of 
justice. The case law cited by Sorf does not suggest that showing a meritorious defense 
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entitles the movant to have the default set aside. See Lund 2000 UT 75. 11 P.3d 277. 
The trial court has significant discretion to decide whether the facts of a particular case < 
justify setting aside default. In other words, a party in default is not entitled to demand 
that the trial court consider the merits of his defenses, but the trial court must ensure that 
i 
the defenses are meritorious prior to setting aside a default. 
In considering whether defenses are meritorious or not, trial courts should avoid 
"mini-trials" analyzing the facts allegedly supporting the defense. See Musselman, 667 
P.2dat 1059 (Durham, J. dissenting). Rather, the purpose of the meritorious defense 
requirement is to determine whether the defenses would be "meritorious as a matter of
 { 
law," assuming the movant could adduce facts to support them. Id^ That is precisely 
what the trial court did in this case. The court found that Sorf s proffered defenses "are 
i 
not meritorious as a matter of law under the circumstances given Plaintiffs defined 
easement, its prior federal ownership, and Plaintiffs status as a political subdivision of 
the state." (Order (R. 354.)) 
Sorf s proposed Answrer asserted nineteen affirmative defenses, but on appeal he 
has chosen to rely on only four. {See Appellant's Brief at 30-34 (relying on the First, 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth2 Affirmative Defenses.)) Sorf has tacitly conceded that 
the other fifteen affirmative defenses asserted to the district court were not meritorious. 
MWDSLS addresses each of the remaining four defenses below. 
2
 While separately numbered, the Fifth and Sixth Affirmative Defenses are actually both 
part of the same defense: equitable estoppel. 
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1. The Regulations Do Not Exceed the Scope of MWDSLS Authority. 
Sorf s argues that MWDSLS's regulations exceed the scope of the easement. (See 
Appellant's Brief at 30-31 (citing First Affirmative Defense (R. 125-26.)) It is important 
to recognize that Sorf has incorrectly framed the argument regarding the validity of 
MWDSLS's regulations. The validity of the regulations does not turn on whether they go 
beyond the scope of the use restrictions to which MWDSLS is legally entitled by virtue 
of its ownership of the SLA easement. Rather, the validity of the regulations turns on 
whether Sorf can establish that MWDSLS exceeded its authority to promulgate them 
(which Sorf does not attempt to argue). As a very separate issue, even if a regulation is 
valid it may result in a taking for which compensation must be paid. MWDSLS 
addresses this second argument below in Section II of this Brief, in the context of Sorf s 
post-judgment motion for leave to file a regulatory takings counterclaim. However, 
MWDSLS's regulations, its exercise of a governmental function, satisfy even Sorf s 
erroneous standard, because MWDSLS's regulations are fully consistent with MWDSLS' 
proprietary property rights. 
It is undisputed that MWDSLS's easement, by its terms and law, is perpetual and 
defined. It allows MWDSLS "to construct, reconstruct, operate and maintain" the SLA, 
including "appurtenant structures, which latter may be situated above ground 
surface...." (See Easement Deeds (R. 39-49) (attached as Add. 12.)) It was recorded 
with the Salt Lake County Recorder in 1946. Id. It was held by the United States until 
2006. Id. The SLA sits within this easement. As a matter of law, MWDSLS's rights are 
dominant to Sorf s servient estate. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
§ 1.2 (2000) ("An easement creates a nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the 
possession of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized 
by the easement."), cited in Holladay Town Center, LLC v. Brown Family Holdings, 
LLC. 2011 UT 9. T^ 36. n.l L 238 P.3d. 452. While Sorf s [Proposed] Answer offered 
generic language regarding a dominant estate holder's "limited and reasonable use" of the 
easement land, the case law specific to utility easements explicitly supports full and 
perpetual utilization of the easement free of impediment from the servient estate. Id_ 
This is a critical theme that guides MWDSLS and other utilities nationwide, as the 
following cases demonstrate: 
• Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Lario Enterprises, Inc., 942 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir. 
1991). In this case, the Tenth Circuit supported the pipeline easement holder's 
claim for injunctive relief mandating the removal of fill and asphalt overlying the 
company's high-pressure liquid gas pipeline easement. The court held that asphalt 
and fill were "structures" within the meaning of the easement and that such 
materials substantially interfered with the operation and maintenance of the 
company's pipeline, including surveillance, surveys, excavation, maintaining, leak 
detection, and repairing the pipeline. The court pointed out that "[a]n obstruction 
or disturbance of an easement is anything which wrongfully interferes with the 
privilege to which the owner of the easement is entitled by making its use less 
convenient and beneficial than before." Id. at 1527 (citation omitted). 
• Mississippi River Transmission Corp. v. Wachter Const., Inc., 731 S.W.2d445 
(Miss. Ct. App. 1987). In this case, the servient estate owner introduced between 
six and ten feet of fill and some asphalt surfacing over plaintiffs natural gas 
pipeline easement. The court ruled that the fill and asphalt over the pipeline right 
of way interfered with the pipeline owner's easement for various reasons. The 
court held that "[t]he serving estate owner may not make the easement less useful 
or convenient." 731 S.W.2d at 450 (citation omitted). The easement grant to the 
pipeline company included the right to "lay, construct, reconstruct, replace, renew, 
maintain, repair, operate, change the size of, and remove pipes and pipelines for 
the transportation of gas . .. over, through, upon, under and across" the 
defendant's property. Id. at 446. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• Banyan Const. Co., Inc. v. Union Elec. Co., 840 S.W.2d 298 (Ms. Ct. App. 1992). 
In this case, the court held that the construction of a home encroaching on a 150 
foot wide utility transmission line easement was not allowed even though there 
was no utility line in place at that time. The court noted that the easement held by 
the electric utility company granted it the right to install, maintain, or relocate its 
lines within the easement at any time. The court held that despite the fact that the 
home was substantially completed, the easement and the rights there under 
prevailed and the building and improvement upon the easement were to be 
removed. Id. at 301-302. 
• Cox v. East Tenn. Nat. Gas Co.. 136 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). In this 
case, the court held that the servient estate owner's proposal to place four or more 
feet of additional fill over a gas pipeline unreasonably interfered with the easement 
holder's rights due to the potential for increased excavation time, the necessity of 
bringing in additional equipment to make the now required deeper excavations, 
and the resulting time delays for such maintenance. Id. at 628. The gas pipeline 
easement in Cox echoed MWDSLS's easement, specifically providing for "laying, 
constructing, maintaining, operating, altering, replacing, inspecting, patrolling, 
servicing, repairing and removing pipelines . . . . " Id. at 627. 
Sorf wildly exaggerates the impact of MWDSLS's regulations, claiming he has 
been "deprived of all useful purpose of his backyard." (Appellant's Brief at 3.) In his 
"[Proposed] Answer," he asserted that MWDSLS is expanding its easement and 
preventing his "reasonable uses of his property" by imposing MWDSLS's regulations for 
non-district use of the SLA corridor. ([Proposed] Answer at 2 (R. 122-134.)) This is not 
a supportable defense, for a number of reasons. First, Sorf fails to acknowledge that his 
backyard was just that—a landscaped back yard (grass, trees, bushes, some flatwork)— 
for over twenty years before he began his large-scale improvements in 2009. With 
MWDSLS's regulations, he still has a landscaped back yard, just as he has had for the 
more than two decades he has lived at his current address. Second, MWDSLS's 
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regulations are promulgated in accordance with statute3 and come with a strong 
presumption of validity.4 More importantly, they specifically allow for Sorf and most, if < 
not all, other servient estate holders to license certain SLA corridor encroachments—-just 
as was done with the United States Bureau of Reclamation for the previous six decades.5 
(See MWDSLS Regulations, Chapter 16 - Regulation for Non-District Use of SLA, (R. 
21-32) (attached as Add. 1.)) Even a cursory review of these regulations reveals the 
nature, concerns, and protection specifications for the SLA, as well as the licensing 
process and the rights of appeal for each applicant—neither of which Sorf has availed 
himself to. (Id.) In sum, MWDSLS's regulations allow for landscaping, certain 
hardscapes, and existing trees more than twenty feet from the center of the aqueduct. 
Sorf is free to enjoy all these things, just as he did in the past. 
Lastly, regardless of Sorf s knowledge or perspective on MWDSLS's easement, 
his continued occupation of it constitutes trespass per se: 
3
 See Utah Code Ann. § 17B-1-30U2XJ). 
4
 See, e.g., State v. Amaru 2004 UT App 32. ^T 10, 100 P.3d 231 ("It is a basic principle 
that legislative enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity."); 6 
McQuillin Mun. Corp. $ 20:6 (3rd ed.) (same). 
5
 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation regulations have long required encroachment licenses on 
federal reclamation rights of way. See 43 C.F.R. 429.7. Before MWDSLS's regulations, 
there was a well-established framework for managing encroachments. See "Land Use 
Authorizations" in Reclamation Manual: Directives and Standards, U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation (Jan. 3, 2002) (providing "standard procedures for issuing land use 
authorization documents such as easements, leases, licenses, and permits which allow 
others to use Reclamation lands and interests in its land . . . ."), available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/recman/lnd/lnd08-01.pdf. Therefore, Sorf s assertion that 
MWDSLS's regulations present a new and never before seen regulatory environment is 
patently incorrect. 
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In order to be liable for a trespass on land under the rule stated in 
[Restatement] § 158, it is necessary only that the actor intentionally be 
upon any part of the land in question. It is not necessary that he intend to 
invade the possessor's interest in the exclusive possession of his land and, 
therefore, that he know his entry to be an intrusion. 
Gallezos v. Lloyd, 2008 UT App 40. If 11. 178 P.3d 922 {quoting Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 164 cmt. a (1965)). 
2. Sorf Cannot Adversely Possess the SLA Easement. 
There is no merit to Sorf s argument for adverse possession. {See Appellant's 
Brief at 32-33 (citing Third Affirmative Defense) (R. 127.)) There is simply no such 
thing as adverse possession of government property. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-216; see 
also 10 McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 28:71 (3rd ed.) (title to property held by a municipal 
corporation for a public use cannot be acquired by adverse possession); 3 Am. Jur. 2d 
Adverse Possession § 268 (generally, title by adverse possession cannot be acquired as to 
public property or to property held as a public trust); Peterson v. Johnson, 34 P.2d 697, 
698-99 (Utah 1934) (title to public domain cannot be acquired by adverse possession by 
inclosing part of public domain within fence); Nvman v. Anchor Development L.L.C* 
2003 UT 27.112. 73 P.3d 357 (same); Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman. 152 P. 178 (Utah 
1915) (same). The United States held this easement from 1946 to 2006. Since then 
MWDSLS has held it in trust for the public. (Easement Deeds (R. 39-49) (attached as 
Add. 12.)) Sorf s adverse possession defense is without merit. 
3. Neither the U.S. nor MWDSLS Abandoned the Easement. 
There is no way Sorf could ever establish that MWDSLS had somehow abandoned 
the SLA Easement. {See Appellant's Brief at 32-33) (citing Fourth Affirmative Defense 
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i 
(R. 127)). In hunt v. Lance, the Utah Court of Appeals specifically addressed the 
requirements for abandonment of an easement: i 
An easement is abandoned where there is action releasing the right to use 
the easement combined with clear and convincing proof of the intent to 
make no further use of it. Put another way, a history of non-use, coupled 
with an act or omission showing a clear intent to abandon is sufficient to 
show abandonment. Actual abandonment or intent to abandon may also be 
inferred from extended non-use of a portion of an easement ;;in connection 
with other facts. In determining whether an easement has been abandoned, 
courts should consider whether or not the right was acquired by 
prescription or grant, the extent of its use, and the actual intent of the 
owner. 
2008UTApp 192,1125, 186P.3d978 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Sorf s 
[Proposed] Answer asserted that MWDSLS's SLA corridor easement was abandoned 
because there has been little if any activity on the ground. ([Proposed] Answer at 3 (R. 
127.)) As detailed above, the SLA has been in the ground for six decades. It is a 
perpetual easement "to construct, reconstruct, operate and maintain" the SLA, including 
"appurtenant structures, which latter may be situated above ground surface . . . . " 
(Easement Deeds (R. 39, 48) (attached as Add. 12.)) Sorf s assertion that a long 
undisturbed utility line and supporting easement are somehow lost to abandonment by the 
passage of time defies law and logic. Western Gateway Storage Co. v. Treseder. 567 
P.2d 181, 182 (Utah 1977) ("[A] right gained by conveyance may not be lost by non-use 
alone and . . . an actual intent to abandon [must] be evident."). It should go without 
saying that underground utilities pervade all developed urban and rural areas, and their 
maintenance, operation, reconstruction, and relocation is critical for public welfare and 
safety. Such is the case here. Sorf has demonstrated nothing that would give any 
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indication of MWDSLS's abandonment of the SLA and its corridor. To the contrary, 
MWDSLS conducted routine inspections of the SLA corridor and affirmatively took 
steps to address Sorf s unlicensed encroachments thereon. (Verified Compl. at ffif 33-35 
(R. 11-12.)) 
4. MWDSLS Cannot Be Equitably Estopped from Protecting the SLA. 
There is no merit to Sorf s final defense of equitable estoppel. (See Appellant's 
Brief at 33) (citing Fifth and Sixth Affirmative Defenses (R. 127-28)). Equitable 
estoppel6 is generally not available against governmental entities: 
Our decision is reinforced by the institutional reluctance of Utah courts to 
apply equitable doctrines against municipal bodies and governmental 
subdivisions. See Eldredge v. Utah State Ret Bd* 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that "the doctrine of [equitable] estoppel is not 
assertable against the state and its agencies"); Xanthos v. Board of 
Adjustment 685 P.2d 1032, 1041 (Utah 1984) (Howe5 J., dissenting) 
(explaining that generally, courts are reluctant to impose the equitable 
doctrines of laches and waiver against governmental subdivisions). 
Tooele Assoc. LP. v. Tooele City, 2011 UT App 36, f 3. 251 P.3d 835; see also Vial v. 
Provo City, 2009 UT App 122, ^T 26, 210 P.3d 947 ("As a general rule, estoppel may not 
be invoked against a governmental entity."). 
6
 The elements of equitable estoppel are: 
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent 
with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other 
party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or 
failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would result from 
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, 
act, or failure to act. 
Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d 671. 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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( 
Sorf seemingly acknowledges this general rule, but argues that this case presents 
"unusual circumstances.'5 He attempts to parlay alleged conversations with MWDSLS < 
employees into binding approval of his easement encroachments, claiming the evidence 
of his detrimental reliance on alleged oral statements is so clear that he would suffer a 
grave "injustice" if MWDSLS were not equitably stopped from protecting the SLA 
easement. (Appellant's Brief at 33-34.) An additional basis for his equitable estoppel 
defense, newly raised in this appeal, is that Sorf looked around his neighborhood and 
could not tell that MWDSLS was enforcing its rights under the SLA easement against 
other servient property owners.7 Sorf never asserted this in his proposed Answer. (See i 
[Proposed] Answer at 3-4 (R. 127-28.)) 
: . i 
' Essentially, Sorf is making an Equal Protection Clause "class of one" claim without 
formally declaring it as such. The federal courts have described such claims as follows: 
In the paradigmatic class-of-one case, a public official inflicts a cost or 
burden on one person without imposing it on those who are similarly \ 
situated in material respects, and does so without any conceivable basis 
other than a wholly illegitimate motive.. . . The paradigmatic "class of 
one" case, more sensibly conceived, is one in which a public official, with 
no conceivable basis for his action other than spite or some other improper 
motive (improper because unrelated to his public duties), comes down hard \ 
on a hapless private citizen. 
HighlandDev. Inc. v. Duchesne County. 505 F. Supp. 2d 1129. 1150 (D. Utah. 2007) 
(quoting Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba County. 440 F.3d 1202> 1209 (10th Cir. 
2006). To establish a "class of one" Equal Protection claim, Sorf would have to show ^ 
two elements: (1) that MWDSLS intentionally treated him differently from others 
similarly situated; and (2) "that the official action was objectively irrational and abusive." 
Id. (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). "[W]hen the class consists of one 
person or entity, it is exceedingly difficult to demonstrate that any difference in treatment 
is not attributable to a quirk of the plaintiff or even to the fallibility of administrators i 
whose inconsistency is as random as it is inevitable." Jicarilla. 440 F.3d at 1212-13 
(emphasis added). 
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If this Court found Sorf s equitable estoppel arguments meritorious, it would 
represent an unprecedented expansion of the narrow exception upon which Sorf relies. 
Although our courts have never required that the governmental statement 
be written, our supreme court has observed that u[t]he few cases in which 
Utah courts have permitted estoppel against the government have involved 
very specific written representations by authorized government entities." 
Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 839 P.2d 822. 827 (Utah 1992). In both 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689 
(Utah 1979). and Eldredze v. Utah State Retirement Board. 795 P.2d 671 
(Utah Ct.App. 1990). Utah appellate courts applied equitable estoppel 
against government entities based on "very clear, well-substantiated 
representations by government entities." Anderson, 839 P.2d at 828 
(discussing Celebrity Club and Eldredge). 
McLeodv. RetirementBd. 2011 Utah App. 190.122, 257 P.3d 1090. In McLeodAhe 
plaintiff claimed he detrimentally relied on three different telephone conversations with 
government employees. Those conversations were corroborated, the plaintiff claimed, by 
documents later mailed to him and posted on a government website. Id_ at fflf 23-24. 
Neither the conversations nor the subsequent written corroboration justified an equitable 
estoppel claim against the government entity because "in our view, they fall short of 
'very clear, well-substantiated representations by government entities.5" Id. (quoting 
Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm % 839 P.2d 822. 828 (Utah 1992)). Sorf s equitable 
estoppel defense is based on similar alleged verbal statements, but lacks any of the 
documentary corroboration that was asserted in McLeod. Even if properly raised on 
appeal, Sorf s uninformed assumption that MWDSLS was not enforcing the SLA 
easement around his neighborhood would also obviously "fall short of 'very clear, well-
substantiated representations by government entities/" McLeod, 2011 Utah App. 190. f 
22. 
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Finally, government employees cannot bind the governmental entity to 
commitments or conveyances that would divest assets held in trust for the public without < 
approval of the legislative body or receipt of fair market value compensation. See, e.g., 
Sears v. Ogden. 533 P.2d 118, 119 (Utah 1975); Salt Lake Co. Comm. v. Salt Lake Co. 
Atom 1999 UT 73. % 31. 985 P.2d 899 (Utah 1999); Price Dev. Co. v. Or em City. 2000 
UT26.1T26,995P.2dl237. The SLA and the SLA corridor are MWDSLS assets held in 
trust for the public. As a matter of law, MWDSLS staffs alleged comments to Sorf do 
not support his equitable estoppel defense. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED SORFS' MOTION FOR < 
LEAVE TO FILE A COUNTERCLAIM, 
Sorf s Motion for Leave to File a Counterclaim was properly denied for five 
distinct reasons. First, his argument that his counterclaim did not ripen until after the ( 
court had denied his Motion to Set Aside is not supported by logic or Utah law. Second, 
his Motion for Leave was doomed because MWDSLS5s actions did not constitute a 
( 
regulatory taking. Finally, three distinct procedural flawrs justified the district court's 
denial of Sorf s motion. 
A. Sorf s Cause of Action Accrued When MWDSLS Expressly Demanded 
that Sorf Comply With the SLA Easement and its Regulations—Not 
When the Judgment Was Entered. 
Sorf argues that MWDSLS's pre-litigation demands that he stop all encroaching 
landscaping did not ripen his counterclaim. Instead, he claims, it ripened only when there 
was a court judgment ratifying MWDSLS's attempts to enforce the SLA easement and 
regulations. A cause of action for a regulatory taking accrues when a government entity 
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seeks to apply the regulations to the landowner's detriment. See Gillmor v. Summit 
County. 2010 UT 69, 246 P.3d 102. As the Court in Gillmor explained: 
[0]nce an allegedly unconstitutional zoning ordinance is applied to a land 
owner to prevent her from using or developing her property in a beneficial 
way, she has suffered an injury, her cause of action accrues, and she may 
seek redress by bringing a timely challenge to the application of the 
ordinance to her in a district court action . . . . 
2010 UT 69. m 33. Thus, Sorf s regulatory taking claim ripened when MWDSLS took 
o 
action to enforce its regulatory rights under the easement. 
Like Sorf, the appellee in National Advertising v. Murray City argued "that only 
after receiving final confirmation [from the court] that their permit was valid were they 
able to pursue a counterclaim for breach of contract." 2006 UT App. 75, f^ 9, 131 P.3d 
872. The Court disagreed: 
We note that the Crawfords' contention that they could not file their claim 
for breach of contract and damages until the court found their permit to be 
Sorf s attack on the regulations does not seem to be limited in how the regulations were 
applied to him. To the contrary, he seems to mount a facial challenge to the regulations, 
arguing that they simply go beyond the scope of SLA easement language: 
The SLA easement does not prohibit Mr. Sorf, or any other landowner, 
from installing improvements nor does it authorize the District to compel 
the removal of improvements. As such, it is Mr. Sorf s position that the 
authority granted through the default judgment [based on the regulations] 
dramatically exceeds the express language of the easement. 
(Appellant's Brief at 31 (emphasis added.)) The law is clear that a claim for a facial 
regulatory taking accrues when the regulations are promulgated: 
A facial challenge to a land use regulation becomes ripe upon the 
enactment of the regulation itself.... [T]his limited rule was meant to 
apply only to facial challenges to regulatory takings where the injury to the 
plaintiff is said to occur at the moment the ordinance is enacted and the 
plaintiffs property value is "taken." 
Gillmor, 2010 UT 69 at Tf 31 (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
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valid makes little sense. The Crawfords could have filed their claim as part 
of their original complaint and simply requested that the trial court 
bifurcate the proceedings. Such action would have eliminated the present < 
procedural morass. 
Id. at II26, n. 18. Sorf s argument that he had to wait until after the district court issued a 
final judgment confirming MWDSLS's regulatory rights is wrong. * 
Sorf s claim for inverse condemnation matured when MWDSLS sought to enforce 
the SLA easement regulations against him. MWDSLS told Sorf to stop work on his 
backyard landscaping—which, according to Sorf, cost him "nearly $150,000"—in 
August 2010. (Sorf s Mem. in Sup't of Motion for Leave to File Counterclaim, citing 
i 
Declaration of Zdenek Sorf at % 44 (R. 385.)) While MWDSLS had diligently 
communicated with Sorf and sought to enforce the regulations long before then (see 
Verified Complaint at fflj 30-48 (R. 11-14)), Sorf has admitted that MWDSLS clearly < 
sought to enforce the regulations against him no later than August 2010. In fact, a 
photograph depicting the stop work order, dated August 31, 2010, is attached as 
i 
Addendum 14 to this brief (Exhibit 9 to MWDSLS's Verified Complaint (R. 67.)) 
Thus, by Sorf s own admission, MWDSLS enforced the SLA easement regulations 
against him approximately two months before MWDSLS even filed suit against him. * 
MWDSLS's Verified Complaint was the culmination of this enforcement. It w7as based 
on the terms of the SLA easement and the appurtenant regulations, and demanded the
 ( 
removal of landscaping and structures, as well as the entry of a Cooperation Agreement 
to define the rights and obligations of the parties. There can be no doubt that 
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MWDSLS's Verified Complaint itself was the final articulation of MWDSLS's easement 
rights and the application of its regulations to Sorf s property. 
Sorf s own proposed Counterclaim acknowledges that MWDSLS sought to 
impose the SLA easement restrictions and regulations upon Sorf prior to the entry of the 
Default Judgment. (See Counterclaim (Proposed) (R. 479 at fflj 36-40) (attached as Add. 
13.)) This should be obvious—without Sorf s violation of those restrictions and 
regulations, MWDSLS would have had no need to file the Complaint in the first place. 
Nonetheless, Sorf s allegations in the proposed Counterclaim tellingly blame not just the 
Default Judgment for his alleged inverse condemnation, but also (i.e., separately) 
MWDSLS's imposition of the restrictions and regulations on him. (See id. (R. 479.)) 
Sorf alleges that MWDSLS's restrictions and regulations "eliminated any economically 
viable use of his property," and, most importantly, that they were an "additional]" cause 
of the default judgment. (R. 479 at ^ fl[ 36-40 (emphasis added.)) He complains that an 
inverse condemnation has occurred "through the default judgment and the restrictions 
and regulations being imposed on Mr. Sorf s property, the character of the governmental 
actions, the economic impact of these actions on Mr. Sorf, and the extent to which the 
regulatory actions have interfered with Mr. Sorf s use and enjoyment of his property." 
(R. 479-480 at Tf 39 (emphasis added)). Thus, Sorf has acknowledged that his inverse 
condemnation counterclaim claim arose not merely from the default judgment, but also 
from (1) the "restrictions and regulations" imposed on Sorf, and (2) the "character of the 
governmental actions." These "restrictions and regulations" and "governmental actions" 
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i 
all occurred before the court below entered the Default Judgment against Sorf, and indeed 
before MWDSLS even filed suit. < 
Even if a judgment was needed for Sorf s inverse condemnation claim to mature, 
such a judgment existed as of December 13, 2010, when the district court entered the 
Default Judgment. (R. 99.) Nothing prevented Sorf from filing a proposed counterclaim 
with his Motion to Set Aside on January 28, 2011, but he filed no counterclaim at that 
time. (R. 104-112.) Nothing prevented Sorf from filing a proposed counterclaim along 
with his "[Proposed] Answer5 on February 3, 2011, but he filed no counterclaim at that 
time either. (R. 122-134.) He did not try to file his counterclaim until April 14, 2011, a < 
full four months after judgment was entered. (R. 374.) 
Sorf s position is that "there was no taking . . . until the Default Judgment was 
i 
finalized." (Appellant's Brief at 35.) Sorf uses the word "finalized" not because it is 
found anywhere in Rule 13(d), but because it implies that he was correct to wait until 
after MWDSLS Court denied his Motion to Set Aside to try and file his counterclaim. If -
attempts to undo a valid judgment prevent it from being "finalized," then Sorf s 
counterclaim is not ripe even to this day. "A Utah State court judgment is not final while , 
an appeal is pending or until the time to appeal has expired.55 Chavez v. Morris. 566 F. 
Supp. 359. 360 (citing Young v. Hansen. 218 P.2d 674. 675 (Utah 1950) (holding that "a 
1 
judgment is not final pending appeal.55). Thus by Sorf s reasoning, there is no taking, and 
his counterclaim is not ripe, until this Court affirms the denial of his motion to set aside 
the Default Judgment. This absurd result is the logical consequence of crediting Sorf s * 
argument that he could not file his counterclaim until the Default was "finalized.55 
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Sorf asserts that "multiple courts outside of Utah" have "consistently" supported 
his position, but cites only two cases from Colorado to support this assertion. 
(Appellant's Brief at 40-41.) The first case Sorf cites, Droste v. Board of County 
Commissioners, does not actually support his argument. As quoted by Sorf: 
A taking claim is ripe if the government entity charged with implementing 
the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the 
regulations to the property at issue, and determination whether a taking has 
occurred cannot be made until a court knows the extent of permitted 
development on the land in question. 
85 P3d 585, 591 (Colo. App. 2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Here, 
MWDSLS did reach a "final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the 
property at issue," and MWDSLS's regulations for the SLA easement quite clearly 
delineate "the extent of permitted development on the land in question." I<L_ The Droste 
appellants argued that the decision of a particular Colorado board of commissioners, 
which statutorily charged with deciding whether a taking had occurred, was 
unconstitutional. Id, at 590. However, at the same time the appellants were asking the 
Colorado Court of Appeals to decide that issue, a case was still pending in the trial court. 
Id. at 591. That is why the constitutional takings issue was not yet ripe for decision. Id_ 
The case of Williams v. City of Central is likewise inapposite. There, the property 
owner alleged that a temporary moratorium on gambling activities effected a regulatory 
taking of his property. However, the moratorium lasted only ten months, and the 
property owner was never denied a permit to conduct any economically viable activity on 
his property. That is why the court found that "his claim for inverse condemnation, to the 
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extent that it is based on a permanent regulatory taking, is not ripe for review." 907 P.2d 
701, 708 (Colo. App. 1995). < 
Sorf emphasizes a statement quoted in Williams that a "court cannot determine 
whether a regulation has 'gone too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes." 
Reale Investments, Inc. v. City of Colorado Springs. 856 P.2d 91 (Colo. App. 1993). But 
Sorf does not quote the next sentence in the Reale decision: "That effect cannot be 
measured until a final decision is made as to how the regulations will be applied to the 
property in question." Id_ A review of Reale quickly reveals that the court was not 
referring to itself with this passive-voice statement. Instead the court meant that the 4 
government entity's actions—not a court judgment—were needed to ripen the inverse 
condemnation claim. See id. at 93-94. 
I 
In Reale * a developer had petitioned a city council for a change to the zoning 
ordinance governing his property. After the city council indicated it was not inclined to 
grant his rezoning request, he withdrew the request. Id. at 93. Because an inverse * 
condemnation claim is "not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing 
the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to . 
the property at issue," the court found that the property owner's inverse condemnation 
claim was not ripe. Id. at 94 ("Here, because Reale withdrew its zoning request, there has 
\ 
been no final decision."). 
In summary, the Colorado cases Sorf cites simply do not support the proposition 
that Sorf s inverse condemnation claim did not ripen until the district court denied his i 
motion to set aside the Default Judgment. To the contrary, they show that what is needed 
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is concrete action by a governmental entity to regulate the property owner's land in such 
a way as to deprive all useful benefit of it. All of the regulatory actions upon which Sorf 
would assert his claim for inverse condemnation had already occurred before MWDSLS 
ever filed its Verified Complaint. The district court therefore properly denied his Motion 
for Leave to File a Counterclaim. 
B. MWDSLS's Actions Do Not Give Rise to a Regulatory Taking Claim. 
A categorical regulatory taking requires, among other things, the application of a 
zoning law or other governmental regulation that denies all economically beneficial use 
of the land. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal CounciL 505 U.S. 1003. 1015-16 
(1992); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005); Palazzolo v. Rhode 
Island. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). For a categorical taking to occur, the "whole parcel" must 
be deprived of all economically beneficial use. There is no taking if one portion of the 
parcel is deprived of economically beneficial use, but the remainder is not directly 
affected. Perm Central Transv. Co. v. City of New York. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). "Taking 
jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to 
determine whether rights in a single segment have been entirely abrogated." Id. at 130. 
If a claimant cannot establish that his "whole parcel" has been deprived of all 
economically viable use, he must rely on the default multifactor takings test set forth in 
Perm Central. The United States Supreme Court identified the three factors as follows: 
The [1] economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, 
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with [2] distinct 
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. 
[Citation omitted.] So, too, is [3] the character of the governmental action. 
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Id. at 124 (numbering added). For the reasons set forth below, MWDSLS's actions come 
nowhere close to depriving Sorf s "whole parcel" of all economically beneficial uses, nor < 
can he show that the Perm Central factors, taken together, support his claim. 
First, the SLA easement was established and recorded against what is now Sorf s 
lot in 1946. MWDSLS's property rights, including the SLA corridor, are held in trust for 
the public. MWDSLS is authorized by statute to promulgate regulations to protect the 
public's property rights, w7ater infrastructure and MWDSLS operations. MWDSLS has 
studied the negative effects of load and fill cover levels on certain classes of SLA pipe. 
MWDSLS has also evaluated the effects of construction and installations on, and access < 
to, the SLA and SLA corridor for maintenance, repair (including emergency repairs), and 
replacement of the SLA pipe. In these respects, MWDSLS brought this suit only because 
Sorf s new construction and excavations violated and encroached upon MWDSLS's SLA 
easement, and presented present and future risk to critical public water infrastructure and 
MWDSLS operations. Sorf claims that MWDSLS is "strangling homeowners with rules l 
prohibiting all use of the easement area." (Appellant's Brief at 37.) This assertion is 
wrong on its face, as the whole purpose of the regulations is not to bar homeowners 
reasonable and appropriate use of the SLA corridor, but simply to ensure that activities 
on the easement do not jeopardize a pipeline that directly and indirectly provides crucial 
i 
culinary water to some 500,000 people in the Salt Lake Valley. 
Second, MWDSLS has plenary power to manage its assets held in trust for the 
public. See Board ofEduc. of Jordan School Dist v. Sandy City, 2004 UT 37. ^ 31. 94 < 
P.3d234 (local governments have wide latitude in the operation and administration of 
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their utilities and assets to meet the challenges of urban growth, and therefore, the court 
should not substitute its judgment for that of the city council); Price Dev. Co. v. Or em 
Cit\h 2000 UT 26, IffflO, 19, 995 P.2d 1237 (same); Utah Code Ann. § 17B-l-103(2Yd) 
(providing that local district may operate, control, and maintain public works to the full 
exercise of the district's powers, and "exercise any power reasonably necessary for the 
efficient operation of the local district"); id. at § 17B-l-301(2)fi) (empowering district to 
"adopt and enforce rules and regulations for the orderly operation of the local district or 
for carrying out the district's purposes"). Essentially, Sorf s counterclaim would 
wrongfully ask the district court to "second guess" regulatory acts of MWDSLS. See, 
e.g., Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba County. 440 F.3d 1202, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 
2006). This offends concepts of separation of powers and is not supported under case 
law. Idj see also, Board ofEduc, supra; Price Dev., supra; State v. Hutchinson. 624 
P.2d 1116 (Utah 1981); SLCv. Alfred. 437 P. 2d 434 (Utah 1968). 
Third, MWDSLS has done nothing to deny Sorf all economically beneficial uses 
of his land. The land was used as a moderately landscaped residential back yard before 
Sorf bought it, and Sorf continued to use it as such for over two decades. It quite 
evidently had economic value in that condition, because otherwise Sorf would not have 
purchased it. The suggestion that the land is somehow valueless because Sorf cannot 
make extensive additions—such as water features and buildings—is belied by the history 
of the property, and are contrary to common practice and common sense. 
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C. SorFs Motion Was an Improper Motion to Reconsider. 
The first procedural failing in Sorf s Motion for Leave to File a Counterclaim is i 
that it was essentially a motion to reconsider the court's ruling on his Motion to Set Aside 
Default. Utah Courts are very clear that motions to reconsider, however they may be 
( 
framed, are prohibited. Under the guise of an allegedly newly matured counterclaim, 
Sorf asked the district court to again look at the effect of MWDSLS's easement and 
regulations on his violative improvements on his lot. (See Sorf s Reply Memo Set Aside 
at 3-13 (re: Meritorious Defense) (R. 289); Sorf s [Proposed] Answer at 1-2 (R. 122-
134.)) Such efforts are explicitly prohibited by Utah courts. See Tschaggeny v. Milbank
 i 
Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37. Tf 15, 163 P.3d 615 ("Motions to reconsider are not recognized by 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."), citing Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24. Hf 12. 135 P.3d 
861 ("We therefore affirm the court of appeals and direct attorneys to immediately 
discontinue the practice of filing post judgment motions to reconsider."). 
D. Sorf Never Served a Pleading that Would Have Permitted Him to File * 
a Counterclaim Under Rule 13(d). 
Sorf s Motion for Leave to file a counterclaim was founded on Rule 13(d), which 
provides that a movant may, with the permission of the court, file a counterclaim as a * 
supplemental pleading, but only "after serving his pleading." Rule 13(d), Utah R. Civ. P. 
Sorf never "serv[ed] his pleading." That is why the Default Judgment was entered. 
Sorf s "[Proposed] Answer," which he filed as a supplement to his denied Motion to Set 
Aside, does not satisfy the "pleading" requirement of Rule 13(d). The district court 
denied Sorf s request for leave to file his Answer. Even if Sorf s "[Proposed] Answer" 
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did satisfy Rule 13(d), Sorf did not file his counterclaim with his "[Proposed] Answer." 
(R. 122-134). Rule 13(a) reads: 
Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any 
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any 
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its 
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire 
jurisdiction. 
UtahR. Civ. P. 13(a) (emphasis added). "[A] counterclaim not presented to the court on 
a matter involving the same transaction is forever barred." Todaro v. Gardner. 285 P.2d 
839. 842 (Utah 1955). 
E. Sorf Could Not Amend His Answer Because He Did Not Reopen the 
Default Judgment 
Under National Advertising v. Murray City Corp., 2006 UT App. 75, 131 P.3d 
872, Sorf was required to first reopen the judgment by motion before moving for leave 
and filing a counterclaim. Sorf failed in his efforts to accomplish this when the district 
court denied his motion to set aside the default judgment. His Motion for Leave to File a 
Counterclaim was not accompanied by a companion motion to reopen the judgment, nor 
did it even reference the applicable rules. (See R. 374-485.) As the Court in National 
Advertising stated: 
In Utah, upon occurrence of "a final adjudication, and thereafter, a [party] 
may not file an amended complaint. [Instead, the party] must move under 
[r]ules 59(e) or 60(b) to reopen the judgment." Nichols v. State. 554 P.2d 
231,232 (Utah 1976). Utah's rule is consistent with federal court holdings 
under rules 59 and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Combs 
v. Price Waterhouse Coopers, 382 F.3d 1196. 1205 (10th Cir.2004) ("After 
a district court enters a final judgment... it may not entertain motions for 
leave to amend unless the court first sets aside or vacates the judgment 
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) or 60(b)."); see also Cooper v. Shumwav. 
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780 F.2d 27. 29 (10th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) ("[0]nce judgment is entered 
the filing of an amended complaint is not permissible until judgment is set 
aside or vacated pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) or 60(b)." (citations 
omitted). 
National Advertisings 2006 UT App 75, f^ 13 (citations omitted).9 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, MWDSLS respectfully requests that the district 
court's rulings be affirmed as well within its discretion and correct as a matter of law. 
TzV 
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SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
1—£. -_* : -—jfA 
Shawn E. Draney ' 
Scott H. Martin 
David F. Mull 
Attorneys for Plaintiff MWDSLS 
9
 National Advertising was ultimately decided on the timeliness of Appellee's Motion for 
Leave to Amend under Rules 59(e) and 60(b). 2006 UT App. 75. If 26. 
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CHAPTER 16 
REGULATIONS FOR NON-DISTRICT USE OF 
SALT LAKE AQUEDUCT AND 
POINT OF THE MOUNTAIN AQUEDUCT 
RIGHTS OF WAY 
Last Updated: June 14, 2010 
PREFACE 
This chapter of the P&P contains regulations governing the use of the Salt Lake 
Aqueduct (SLA) and Point of the Mountain Aqueduct (POMA) rights of way, 
construction, excavation, removal and/or placement of materials, or other earthwork, on 
SLA andPOMA rights of way, and construction near enough to SLA andPOMA rights of 
way to potentially adversely impact those rights of way, by persons or entities other than 
the District. 
16-1 GENERAL BACKGROUND 
(1) SLA. The SLA is critical to the water supply of Salt Lake City's retail 
water service-ar-ea^ Sandy City's retail- water service area, and other areas of Salt Lake-
County and Utah County. The U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation 
(Reclamation) designed and constructed the SLA under authority of the Reclamation Act 
of 1902 and the Public Works Administration Appropriation Act of 1938. Since 1938, 
the District has been responsible for the operation and maintenance of the SLA, has been 
repaying to the United States all costs incurred in constructing the SLA, and has been 
entitled to the use of the SLA. Pursuant to the Provo River Project Transfer Act, 
Pub.Law. 108-382, and a title transfer agreement among the District, the Provo River 
Water Users Association and the United States, title to the SLA was transferred to the 
District on October 2, 2006. 
(2) POMA. POMA is a pipeline and associated facilities constructed by the 
District to convey water to the District's member cities. The District owns POMA 
facilities and is responsible for the operation and maintenance of all POMA facilities. 
POMA is critical to the water supply of Salt Lake City's retail water service area, Sandy 
City's retail water service area, and other areas of Salt Lake County and Utah County. 
(3) The intent of this Chapter is to provide guidelines and authorization to 
staff for the licensing of uses of District corridors. Licenses should reasonably 
accommodate other uses of District corridors so long as it is clear that such uses will not 
materially interfere with the District's interests in the use, operation, maintenance, repair 
and replacement of District facilities. Except as otherwise directed by the Board, fees for 
16-1 
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licenses should be reasonably calculated to generally recover direct and indirect District 
costs associated with evaluating, approving, and administering such licenses. The 
Engineering Committee or Board may authorize licenses in addition to those the staff is 
authorized to issue by this chapter, or make exceptions to the regulations, where doing so 
would serve the interests of the District and the public. 
16-2 GENERAL INTENT OF REGULATIONS 
(1) District Assumption of Reclamation Agreements. Reclamation has 
historically provided, by agreement, underlying fee owners, adjoining landowners, and 
others, the right to use portions of the SLA right of way pursuant to 43 United States 
Code, Section 387; 43 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 429, and Reclamation 
Manual/Directives and Standards LND 08-01. As a condition of title transfer, the District 
assumes all of the rights and responsibilities of Reclamation under validly existing 
Reclamation agreements for use of the SLA right of way. 
(2) District's Proprietary and Regulatory Interests. Portions of the SLA and 
POMA rights of way are held in fee, and portions are held under easement. Portions of 
the POMA right of way are located under roads or city parks pursuant to license or 
franchise agreements. The application of these regulations will necessarily vary 
depending upon the nature of the ownership interest of the District. Regardless of the 
nature of the District's ownership interest in the right of way, the District has regulatory 
authority as a subdivision of the State of Utah to protect District facilities. 
(3) Fair Market Value of Use of District Fee Lands. The District is generally 
obligated by state law to charge fair market value for use of fee lands. E.g., Salt Lake Co. 
Comm'n v. Salt Lake Co, Attorney, 985 P.2d 899 (Utah 1999); Municipal Building 
Authority of Iron Co. v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273 (Utah 1985); Sears v. Ogden City, 533 
P.2d 118 (Utah 1975). The District's policy is that it will make reasonable efforts to 
comply with this requirement, and also reasonably recover the estimated actual costs to 
the District of processing and administering Encroachment Agreements, but will 
otherwise attempt to minimize charges. 
(4) SLA Rights Reserved by the United States. Pursuant to the Provo River 
Project Transfer Act, Pub.Law. 108-382, and a title transfer agreement among the 
District, the Provo River Water Users Association and the United States, the United 
States transferred the title of the SLA to the District and the United States reserved an 
easement for the continued, lawful, non-motorized public access across the SLA to 
adjacent public lands. The United States also reserved an easement for Central Utah 
Project facilities within Utah County. All uses of the SLA right of way are subject to 
these easements. The District's General Manager may deny a new or renewed 
encroachment agreement if the District or other agency has any outstanding 
encroachment issues with the applicant or related persons or entities. 
16-2 
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(5) Security. The SLA and POMA are critical public infrastructure, and as 
such the use of SLA and POMA rights of way will be subject to federal, state, local and 
District statutes, regulations, rules, ordinances, policies and procedures designed to 
protect public health, safety and welfare. 
(6) Non-motorized Public Trail Development. The District believes that 
public, non-motorized recreational trail use of portions of the SLA and POMA rights of 
way can be developed in a manner that does not adversely impact the security of the SLA 
or POMA, and does not adversely impact the District's ability to use, operate, repair, 
inspect, maintain or improve SLA or POMA facilities. The District may allow such 
recreational trail development. 
(7) Non-licensed Encroachments. The District may periodically review its 
rights of way to identify non-licensed encroachments. The District may take action to 
remove such encroachments or bring encroachments in compliance with these 
regulations, including payment of all required fees and charges as applicable. 
16-3 DEFINITIONS 
(1) "Applicant" - A person or entity who applies for issuance of an 
Encroachment Agreement by the District. 
(2) "District"- The Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy. 
(3) "Encroachment Agreement" - The Agreement issued to a Grantee who 
has successfully completed the application process. 
(4) "Grantee" - The person or entity applying for and receiving an 
Encroachment Agreement from the District for use of SLA or POMA rights of way. Any 
reference in these regulations to "Grantee" should also be interpreted as referring to 
Grantee's contractors, subcontractors, employees, agents or representatives. 
(5) "Hazardous Materials" include: 
(a) Those substances included within the definitions of "hazardous 
substances", "hazardous materials", "toxic substances", or "solid waste" pursuant to the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, as 
amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 9601, et seq., the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
of 1976, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 6901, et seq., the Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Act, as amended, 49 U.S.C. Section 1981, et seq., and the regulations 
promulgated pursuant to such statutes. 
(b) Those substances listed in the United States Department of 
Transportation Table (49 CFR 172.101 and amendments thereto) or by the United States 
16-3 
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Environmental Protection Agency as hazardous substances (40 CFR Part 302 and 
amendments thereto). 
(c) Such other substances, materials and wastes which are or become 
regulated or which are classified as hazardous or toxic under federal, state, or local laws, 
statutes, ordinances or regulations. This does not include public sewers. 
(6) "POMA" or "Point of the Mountain Aqueduct" - A large transmission 
pipeline that provides municipal and industrial water to the District's member cities. The 
District owns, operates and maintains POMA. 
(7) "Reclamation" or "Bureau of Reclamation" - A bureau of the United 
States Department of the Interior that designed and constructed the SLA and originally 
held title to the SLA. 
(8) "SLA" or "Salt Lake Aqueduct" - The SLA is a large transmission 
pipeline that provides municipal and industrial water to the District's member cities. 
Title to the SLA was transferred to the District on October 2, 2006 pursuant to the Provo 
River Project Transfer Act, Pub. Law. 108-382, and a title transfer agreement among the 
District, the Provo River Water Users Association and the United States. 
16-4 WRITTEN ENCROACHMENT AGREEMENT REQUIRED 
(1) Vehicle Access. Except where SLA or POMA is located under a validly 
existing public road, street or highway, a valid Encroachment Agreement is required for 
any vehicle access on or over the SLA or POMA. Weight restrictions for SLA and 
POMA pipe must be strictly observed. 
(2) Excavation, Earthwork, Construction, Etc. Any excavation, removal of 
material, placement of material or other earth work, or construction work on SLA or 
POMA rights of way where the District holds fee title or easement requires a valid 
Encroachment Agreement. 
(3) Improvements to Previously Approved Encroachments. Any 
improvement to a previously approved encroachment on District rights of way requires a 
new Encroachment Agreement. 
(4) Form of Encroachment Agreement. Encroachment Agreements shall be 
specifically tailored to reflect the proposed use by the Grantee and, therefore, may 
contain terms, conditions and/or limitations that are not reflected in previous or sample 
Encroachment Agreements. The District's General Manager is authorized to execute 
Encroachment Agreements that are consistent with these regulations and applicable law 
on behalf of the District. All activities conducted on SLA or POMA rights of way 
16-4 
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pursuant to an Encroachment Agreement shall be in strict conformity with these 
regulations. 
(5) Encroachment Agreement Time Periods. The Encroachment Agreement 
is valid for the time period specified in the Encroachment Agreement. The maximum 
time period for an Encroachment Agreement is 25 years if the Encroachment Agreement 
is issued to a public agency or utility.- If the Encroachment Agreement is issued to a 
private organization or home owner, the maximum time period is 15 years. 
(6) Encroachment Agreement Renewal. At the end of the effective time 
period, the Grantee shall remove the encroaching facility or renew the Encroachment 
Agreement. The Grantee shall pay all required fees and charges as applicable to renew 
the Encroachment Agreement. 
(7) Grantees Responsible for Employees, Contractors. Grantees are strictly 
liable for failure of their employees, agents, contractors or subcontractors to perform in 
strict conformity with the Encroachment Agreement and these regulations. 
(8) Public Use of District Rights of Way. Use of District rights of way by the 
public will not be permitted without a separate easement agreement requested by the 
Grantee and granted by the District prior to issuance of the Encroachment Agreement. 
16-5 APPLICATION PROCEDURES, FEES 
The District's General Manager is authorized to develop application forms, 
instructions, and procedures to guide the Grantee through the application process. The 
District's Board of Trustees shall adopt a fee schedule for application fees, processing 
fees, right of use fees, and any other fees consistent with these regulations. The Board 
may delegate to the General Manager the ability to establish appropriate fees for use of 
fee title lands. Fees for use of fee title lands may be waived in whole or in part by the 
General Manager to the extent that the licensed use is determined to be beneficial to the 
District (e.g., landscaping is developed and maintained by others). 
16-6 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 
(1) Service Interruption. The SLA and POMA are pipelines that remain in 
service year-round and are critical to the water supply of hundreds of thousands of 
people. Service interruptions of either the SLA or POMA must be expressly 
authorized by the District's General Manager, and are not permitted except in very 
extraordinary circumstances. Unauthorized interruptions to pipeline service of the 
SLA or POMA will not be tolerated and could result in the responsible party paying any 
and all incidental and consequential damages including, but not limited to: 
(a) Lost revenue from water sales; 
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(b) Engineering personnel time; 
(c) Operation and maintenance personnel time; 
(d) All costs required to return the affected pipeline back to its full 
service capacity; 
(e) Any costs incurred by the District's member cities that are over 
and above the normal costs associated with the affected pipeline; 
(f) The value of the water which could not be used due to the 
interruption; and 
(g) Third party claims tied to lack of water. 
Unauthorized interruptions of service will likely result in criminal and civil actions, 
particularly if determined to be willful or negligent The District will participate in, 
and direct vigorous enforcement activities against any persons who cause, or who 
are associated with causing, any unauthorized interruptions in service of the SLA or 
POMA. 
(2) Contamination of "Water Supply. Water conveyed by theSLA and POMA 
is used in a municipal and industrial water supply. The Grantee shall not introduce 
pollutants or place foreign materials of any kind in water conveyance facilities. In the 
event of a hazardous material spill, or if there is any release of materials into the water 
that may affect the operation of the SLA or POMA5 the Grantee shall notify the District 
immediately. 
(3) Prior Notice 
(a) Following the issuance of an Encroachment Agreement, the 
Grantee shall invite the District to any Pre-Construction Meeting. 
(b) The Grantee shall contact the District either in writing or by phone 
at least one week in advance of any planned test excavation or construction activities 
within District rights of way. 
(4) Construction Activities 
(a) The Grantee shall designate a representative for field operations 
who shall be the sole representative of the Grantee and the Grantee's contractors in 
dealings with the District, and shall provide their name, address, and telephone number to 
the District prior to commencement of construction. 
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(b) The Grantee shall limit its construction to the approved 
encroaching facilities and construct the improvements strictly in accordance with the 
approved plans or specifications. 
(c) The Grantee shall notify the District upon completion of 
construction. 
(d) Within sixty (60) days after conclusion of construction operations, 
all construction materials and related litter and debris, including vegetative cover 
accumulated through land clearing, shall be disposed of in an appropriate manner. 
(5) Storage of Equipment or Materials. Equipment or materials shall not be 
stored on access roads, or other access areas, unless specific written approval is given by 
the District. All persons or entities using access roads shall coordinate with the District 
to allow District personnel access to any access roads. 
(6) Hazardous Materials, Pesticides, Pollutants 
(a) Storage, handling, use, or transportation of hazardous materials is 
strictly forbidden on or adjacent to any District right of way without the prior written 
permission of the District. All state, federal and local statutes, rules, regulations and 
ordinances concerning the use of hazardous materials, insecticides, herbicides, 
fungicides, rodenticides, and other similar substances shall be strictly observed. 
(b) Prior to the use of hazardous materials, insecticides, herbicides, 
fungicides, rodenticides, and other similar substances on or adjacent to District rights of 
way, the Grantee shall obtain, from the District, approval of a written plan for such use. 
The plan shall state the type and quantity of material to be used, the pest to be controlled, 
the method of application, and such other information as may be required. All use of 
such substances on or near the District rights of way shall be in accordance with the 
approved plan. If the use of a substance is prohibited by the Environmental Protection 
Agency, it shall not be used. If use of a substance is limited by the Environmental 
Protection Agency, it shall be used only in accordance with that limitation. 
(7) Vegetation, Restoration and Reseeding 
(a) Except as otherwise agreed by the District in writing, ground 
surfaces within District rights of way must be restored to a condition equal to that which 
existed before the encroachment work began, or as shown on the approved plans or 
specifications. 
(b) The Grantee shall exercise care to preserve the natural landscape 
and shall conduct its construction operation so as to prevent any unnecessary destruction, 
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scarring, or defacing of the natural surroundings in the vicinity of the work. Except 
where clearing is required for permanent works, all trees, native shrubbery, and 
vegetation shall be preserved and shall be protected from damage that may be caused by 
the Grantee's construction operations and equipment unless otherwise directed by the 
District. Movement of crews and equipment within the rights of way and over routes 
provided for access to the work shall be performed in a manner to prevent damage to 
roadways, grazing land, crops, or property. 
(c) Plans for restoration of District rights of way areas where soils and 
surface materials are disturbed through actions incident to construction, operation, and 
maintenance shall be approved by the District. 
(d) The Grantee shall be responsible for prevention and suppression of 
all uncontrolled fires that are caused by the Grantee, its agents, or assigns. The Grantee 
shall be responsible for restoration of damaged areas. 
(8) Damage to District Facilities. All damage to District facilities shall be 
repaired by the Grantee to the satisfaction of the District. If emergency repair work is 
necessary, or the Grantee fails to complete all work covered by the applicable agreement 
with the District in a reasonable time as determined by the District, any remaining or 
incomplete work will be performed by the District and the Grantee will be required to 
reimburse the District for all expenses incurred by the District in completing the work. 
(9) Unanticipated Conditions. If unanticipated field conditions are 
encountered while a project is being undertaken, the District reserves the right to impose 
additional or more stringent requirements than may be generally described in this 
Chapter 16. The District may also issue a written amendment to the Encroachment 
Agreement. 
(10) Record Drawings. Within 30 days of completion of construction, the 
Grantee shall provide to the District three (3) copies of record drawings. The record 
drawings shall include, but not be limited to, X,Y,Z, GPS coordinates of District 
facilities, utility crossings, manholes, drains, power poles, etc. A topographic survey 
shall be completed to document any changes to grade. Electronic files of record 
drawings shall be submitted to the District in a format acceptable to the District. 
16-7 PROTECTION STANDARDS 
(1) Surface Structures 
(a) Surface structures are allowed within District rights of way so long 
as construction and use of those surface structures do not alter or interfere with the use, 
operation, maintenance, repair, replacement or improvement of any District facilities. 
Approved surface structures include asphalt roadways (without utilities), parking lots, 
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curbs, gutters, sidewalks, walkways, driveways and patios that are non-reinforced and not 
connected to buildings. All surface structures are subject to approval by the District on 
an individual basis. 
(b) Surface structures located over District pipelines shall be designed 
to meet maximum allowable loading restrictions and minimum cover requirements as 
determined by the District. 
(c) Except as otherwise expressly agreed in writing by the District, if 
the District determines that it is necessary to remove or damage surface structures for the 
use, operation, maintenance, repair, replacement, or improvement of any District 
facilities, repair or replacement of the removed or damaged surface structures will be the 
responsibility of the Grantee and its successors. 
(2) Buildings, Other Structures. Buildings and other permanent structures are 
not allowed to be constructed within or overhanging District rights of way. The 
following types of structures are not allowed: buildings, footings, foundations, retaining 
walls, block or concrete slab walls, decks, carports, trailers, light poles, flag poles, 
trampolines, motor cross facilities, power poles, swimming pools, wading pools or ponds, 
decorative pools or ponds, or similar water features. Other types of permanent structures 
not listed will be evaluated by the District for approval. 
(3) Vehicle Access Weight Restrictions " " ~ ~ " 
(a) No vehicular traffic will be allowed over Type A SLA pipe unless 
adequate protection is provided and specifications approved by the District. No vehicular 
traffic exceeding HS-20 loading will be allowed over Type B, C, and D SLA pipe unless 
adequate protection is provided and specifications approved by the District. 
(b) No vehicular traffic exceeding HS-20 loading will be allowed over 
the POMA unless adequate protection is provided and specifications approved by the 
District. 
(4) Reasonable and Efficient District Access 
(a) The District shall have reasonable and efficient access to all 
portions of District rights of way and facilities. No fences or similar barrier will be 
allowed within District rights of way except as consistent with these regulations. 
(b) Except for District purposes, installation of new or replacement 
fences is not allowed on District fee title property. Existing fences, previously authorized 
by agreement prior to October 2, 2006, on or across District fee title property may, by 
agreement, remain until District activities require removal. Other uses of District fee title 
property will be allowed as set forth in other sections of this chapter of the P&P. Fences 
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without footings or foundations may be allowed on property encumbered by District 
easements on a case by case basis. Concrete walls and masonry block walls will not be 
allowed. Grantee shall permit reasonable and efficient access to enclosed portions of 
District rights of way. 
(c) Fences enclosing District structures or rights of way shall provide 
gated openings large enough to permit reasonable and efficient access by District 
maintenance vehicles without damaging the fence and improvements of the District rights 
of way user. Grantee shall allow District to install District locks on access gates. 
(d) All fences within District rights of way are subject to removal by 
District as required to maintain or replace pipe or structures. Except as otherwise 
expressly agreed in writing by the District, removal and replacement of fences shall be 
the responsibility of the Grantee and its successors. 
(5) Trees and Vines 
(a) No new trees or vines will be allowed within District rights of way. 
Existing trees and vines within 20 feet of centerline of District pipelines or on access 
paths and roads used by District are not allowed. Existing trees and vines outside 20 feet 
of centerline of District pipelines or on access paths and roads used by District may 
remain until removal is required for safe operation or replacement of the pipeline or 
access paths and r ^ " ' " " " ~ " 
(b) All vegetation within the District rights of way shall be maintained 
by the property owner or Grantee, as the case may be. All vegetation within District 
rights of way is subject to removal by District as required to maintain or replace pipe or 
structures. Except as otherwise expressly agreed in writing by the District, removal and 
replacement of vegetation shall be the responsibility of the Grantee and its successors. 
(6) Changes in Ground Surfaces, Lateral Support 
(a) All temporary or permanent changes in ground surfaces within 
District rights of way are encroaching structures and require an encroachment agreement. 
Grantee is required to comply with District requirements for minimum and maximum 
depths of cover over the SLA and POMA. 
(b) Any fills and cuts on properties adjacent to District rights of way 
shall not encroach onto District rights of way without specific written prior approval by 
the District. Modifications of properties adjacent to District rights of way shall not 
reduce lateral support for District rights of way without specific written prior approval by 
the District. 
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(7) Drainage From or Onto District Rights of Way. Existing gravity drainage 
over and from District rights of way must be maintained at all times. Any erosion from 
construction, operation, maintenance or use activities must be controlled at all times. No 
new concentration of surface or subsurface drainage may be directed onto or under the 
District rights of way without a showing of adequate provisions for removal of drainage 
water, and the specific prior written approval of the District. 
(8) Test Excavation. Prior to final design of any structure that encroaches 
within District rights of way, an excavation must be made to determine the location of 
existing District facilities. Any such excavation must be made only by, or in the presence 
of, authorized District personnel. 
(9) Bedding for pipe or other District facilities. Compaction. Grantee is 
required to comply with District requirement related to bedding of pipe and other District 
facilities and compaction requirements. 
(10) Metallic Strip. Any nonmetallic encroaching structure below ground level 
shall be accompanied with an approved locator wire running through the entire length of 
the District right of way. 
(11) Utility Crossings 
~ "" "(a) '" Utility crossings of ""District" rights of way "will require an 
encroachment agreement on an individual basis. All applicable state, city, and county 
regulations shall be adhered to in the construction of utilities. Where utilities will be 
constructed by or for a developer, but dedicated to a municipality or other local 
governmental entity or regulated public utility, the District will require the Encroachment 
Agreement to be signed by that municipality or other local governmental entity or 
regulated public utility. 
(b) All utility crossings shall provide a minimum of eighteen (18) 
inches of clearance between pipeline or conduit and the SLA or POMA. All sewer lines 
shall be installed in a carrier pipe extending a minimum of 25 feet each side of SLA or 
POMA centerline, as directed by the District. All culinary pipeline crossings under the 
SLA or POMA shall be installed in a carrier pipe extending a minimum of 25 feet each 
side of SLA or POMA centerline, as directed by the District. Carrier pipes shall consist 
of either welded steel pipe or welded HDPE. Coating, lining and thickness of carrier 
pipes shall be approved by the District. 
(c) Angles of crossing utilities shall be 90 degrees in relation to the 
SLA or POMA whenever practicable, and not less than 60 degrees. Parallel utilities are 
not allowed within District rights of way. 
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(d) Metal pipes which are in close proximity to and may affect District 
pipelines shall implement corrosion protection measures that provide adequate protection 
of the District's pipelines. < 
(e) Boring of utility crossings may be required by the District. 
Decisions will be made on an individual basis. 
(f) If material from the excavation is not suitable as backfill, it shall
 i 
be removed from the site by and at the expense of the Grantee. 
(g) Any buried utility shall be accompanied with warning tape. This 
tape shall be located 12 inches above the structure and extend from right of way edge to 
right of way edge.
 ( 
16-8 APPEALS 
Any decision of the General Manager regarding District rights of way may be 
appealed to the Engineering Committee. All appeals shall be in writing explaining the 
reasons for the appeal. In order for appeals to be considered by the Engineering 
Committee, the written appeal must be received within 30 days following receipt of the 
decision of the General Manager and at least 10 business days prior to the next scheduled 
Engineering Committee meeting. Replies will be answered in writing. Any decision of 
t h e " ^ regarding T)lstoct rights o ~ -
District's Board of Trustees. All appeals shall be in writing explaining the reasons for the 
appeal. In order for appeals to be considered by the District's Board of Trustees, the 
written appeal must be received within 30 days following receipt of the decision of the 
Engineering Committee and at least 10 business days prior to the next scheduled Board of 
Trustees meeting. Replies will be answered in writing. 
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I, Mel B. Ashton hereby certify under the penalties of perjury and in accordance with the provisions set forth by 
the State of Utah, Section 78B-5-705 the following: 
I am a citizen of the United States over the age of i 8 years at the time of service herein, and am not a party to or 
have an interest in the within action. 
I received the attached SUMMONS, COMPLAINT, EXHIBITS AND LETER on October 28, 2010 and served the 
same on October 28, 2010 at 5:40 p.m. on Zdenek Sorf, by serving his wife, Mrs. Sorf at 9825 South Mount Jordan 
Road, Sandy, Utah 84092. The woman answering the door said that Zdenek wasn't home. I asked if she was his 
wife and she said "yes". I told her I had a complaint and that I was serving her for Zdenek. She said that she 
wouldn't take it and I dropped it on the floor inside the door of the house and walked away. She picked up the 
papers and threw them at me and they landed in the driveway. Mrs. Sorf is a white female about 5' 5" tall, 115 
pounds, brown shoulder length hair and about 45 years old. 
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct. 
I further certify that at the time of service I endorsed the date and time of service and added my name thereto. 
2# 
Dated this $7 day of October, 2010 
7rU?&^M^ 
Mel B. Ashton, DPS License PI00001 
A. A. & Associates, Inc. 
P.O. Box 964 
Sandy, Utah 84091 
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SHAWN E. DRANEY (4026) 
SCOTT H. MARTIN (7750) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTTNEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Facsimile: (801) 363-0400 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT 













) Civil No. 100921025 
) 
) Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
) 
) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
MEL ASHTON, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that: 
.1. I am over the age of 21 years and have personal knowledge of the facts stated in 
this declaration. 
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2. I am currently working as a certified process server and investigator licensed by 
the Utah Department of Public Safety. I am a retired agent for the United Stated Drug 
Enforcement Administration, having worked with them for 20 years, and I was a police officer 
for Salt Lake City for 8 years before my employment with the DEA. 
3. On October 28, 2010, having been tasked with service of process of Summons 
and Complaint on the defendant, Zdenek Sorf, I went to his home located at 9625 South Mount 
Jordan Road in Sandy, Utah at 5:40 p.m. I rang the doorbell and a woman opened the door. She 
was an adult who appeared well over the age of 21 years. There was another female who 
appeared to be in her early teens standing behind the woman and they were smiling. 
4. I asked the woman if Zdenek Sorf was home and she responded: "He's not home 
right now." I asked the woman if she was his wife, and she responded "Yes." 
5. I told the woman that I had a complaint that I was leaving with her for Zdenek 
Sorf and she said she would not take it. I dropped the Summons and Complaint inside the door 
at her feet and told her that she was served. She slammed the door. As I was walking back to 
my car, she opened the door and threw the Summons and Complaint at me and they landed in the 
driveway. 
6. I prepared the return of service of the Summons and Complaint, indicating that I 
served Mr. Sorf s wife based on her representation that she was, indeed, his wife. 
7. On December 23, 2010,1 was tasked with service on the defendant of the Notice 
of Default Judgment. I once again traveled to the residence at 9625 South Mount Jordan Road in 
Sandy at 1:09 p.m. 
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8. I rang the doorbell.and the same woman answered the door. I said "Mrs. Sorf?" 
and she said "Yes." I showed her the documents and she said "No" and slammed the door. I 
said in a loud voice to be heard through the door that she had been served, and that the 
documents were being left in the door. I left the documents and went back to my car. 
9. At the time of service of both sets of documents, the same woman answered the 
door and on both occasions she represented herself as the defendant's wife. 
DATED this H& day of February, 2010. 
2 ^ f QJLJ^J 
Mel Ashton" 




NOTARY PUBUC • STATE of UTAH 
COMMISSION #003873 
COMM. EXP. 12-08*2014 
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SHAWN E. DRANEY (4026) 
SCOTT H. MARTIN (7750) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Facsimile: (801)363-0400 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DECLARATION OF 
DEBORAH M. WHARFF 
Civil No. 100921025 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DEBORAH M. WHARFF, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that: 
1. I am over the age of 21 years and have personal knowledge of the facts stated in 
this declaration. 
2. I am a paralegal at the law firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, where I have 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT 
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been employed for 14 years. 
3. In September, 2010,1 was asked to review the state and federal court dockets for ( 
prior law suits against the defendant in this matter, Zdenek Sorf. A state wide search revealed 
Mr. Sorf as a named party in 28 suits, and in 27 of those 28 suits, Mr. Sorf is a defendant A 
copy of a printout dated February 3, 2011 is attached as Exhibit A. The information contained in 
Exhibit A is the same information reviewed in September, 2010, with the exception of the 
addition of the instant case. 
4. From those actions identified on Exhibit A, I went to the dockets for the various 
cases. 15 of theactionidentified on Exhibit A are tax liens filed for failure to paytaxes either 
personally or for sales or other tax obligations of CNS Machine or Cruzrs Salon, Mr. Sorf s 
business interests. There are both criminal and civil matters and several of the dockets from 
these matters are attached at Exhibit B. 
5. The dockets at Exhibit B illustrate Mr. Sorf s extensive experience with the court 
systems: 
A. Case 011903461: Mr. Sorf was arrested on 3-5-01 for disturbing the 
peace and trespass. He failed to appear for arraignment and a bench warrant issued. He finally 
appeared and eventually there was a bench trial He was fined and given 1 year probation. 
B. Case 014905627: In this divorce action Mr. Sorf was represented by 
James McPhie. Personal service was achieved on his spouse, and he answered the complaint in a 
timely manner. Mr. Sorf failed to pay support in subsequent orders to show cause was 
eventually held in contempt by the court with judgment entered that was eventually satisfied. 
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C. Case 020100793: In this collection case Mr. Sorf was personally served 
on 1-18-02. He failed to file an answer and default judgment was taken on 2-12-02. 
Supplemental order issued and garnishments were served until eventual satisfaction of the 
judgment. 
D. Case 040400428: In this matter, Mr. Sorf was served as doing business as 
CNC Machine & Design. The agent (not Mr. Sorf) was served. No answer was filed and default 
judgment was taken. A supplemental order issued and Mr. Sorf failed to appear, causing an 
order to show cause to issue. Judgment was satisfied 6 months later. 
E, Case 056917406: This Labor Commission matter had an administrative 
judgment entered. A writ of garnishment and supplemental order issued on the account of Mr. 
Sorf s business, CNC Machine. No one appeared for the defendant A Writ of Execution 
eventually issued and within 2 weeks, judgment was satisfied. 
F. Case 080904887: Workforce Services sued Mr. Sorf and his business, 
CNC Machine. It appears that an administrative case was filed. Mr. Sorf was served with an 
Order Enforcing Subpoena. An Order to Show Cause issued and was objected to by Mr. Sorf s 
attorney, Bradley Wm. Bowen. This matter was dismissed. 
G. Case 081904729: This criminal matter involved a false information 
charge against Mr. Sorf, who used the name Wayne Frank Barbuto, an individual whose address 
is listed on the same street as Mr. Sorf s, as well as charges of operating a vehicle without 
insurance and driving on a denied license. An arraignment was scheduled and Mr. Sorf failed to 
appear. There is a $5000 warrant currently outstanding according to the docket. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6. In September, 2010,1 also entered Mr. Sorf s name into the Corporations 
Division search engine to determine his business interests, if any. A copy of a current printout of 
that information is attached at Exhibit C. Mr. Sorf is listed as an officer, director, or registered 
agent of the following business interests: 
A. Wasatch Front Entertainment, Inc. 
B. Sorf & Miller, Inc. 
C. Cruzrs Saloon, Inc. 
D. Evans and Sorf, LLC. 
E. CNC Machine and Design, Inc. 
7. OnNovember22nd,2010,I was asked to attend a telephone conference with 
Shawn Draney and Mr. Sorf. Mr. Sorf acknowledged service of the Summons and Complaint 
and asked what could be done to solve the problem. Mr. Draney indicated that Mr. Sorf should 
call District representatives who stood ready and willing to talk to him. Mr. Draney informed 
Mr. Sorf that we intended to file a default certificate with the court in that he had failed to answer 
the complaint. Mr. Draney explained to Mr. Sorf why the additional soil he had piled on top of 
the Aqueduct pipe was a problem. Mr. Draney reiterated that the District had been trying to 
work with him to solve the problem, but that he had failed to respond or to cooperate, forcing the 
District to file the complaint. Mr. Draney indicated the District would still be willing to talk to 
him, and provided telephone numbers for the General Manager and the Assistant General 
Manager. When the telephone conference was completed, I immediately prepared a 
memorandum to the file to memorialize the date and general content. A copy of that 
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memorandum is attached at Exhibit D. 
h DATED this ^ ^ d a y of February, 2011. 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this _ 2 daY of Feb: 
SHELLY K. DEAL 
Nofary Public Staie of Utah 
My Commission Empires on: 
July 10, 2014 
Comm. Number: 5B3229 
1649855 
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SNOW, CHRISTENSEN&MARTINEAU 
M E M O R A N D U M 
To: Sorf File 
From: DMW 
Date: November 22, 2010 
Subject: Call from Sorf 
Shawn received a telephone call today from Mr. Sorf. I was asked to attend to confirm 
the content of the conversation. 
Mr. Sorf asked "what can we do?" Shawn indicated that he needed to call Wayne or 
Mike and set up a meeting with them. In the meantime, we are going to enter a default certificate 
with the court as his time to answer had lapsed. Shawn indicated that Sorf could talk with the 
District or hire counsel and that Shawn could talk to counsel. 
Sorf said that all he did was "improve the lot". Shawn explained that the pipe was rated 
for a certain weight and that when you piled soil on top the weight was exceeded and threatened 
the water supply of about a half-million people. Sorf claimed he had tried to contact District 
representatives. 
Shawn gave Sorf the telephone numbers of both Wayne Winsor and Mike Wilson and 
Sorf thanked him and hung up. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM 6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I. 
SHAWN E. DRANEY (4026) 
SCOTT H. MARTIN (7750) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTTNEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11* Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Facsimile: (801)363-0400 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT ] 
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) DECLARATIONS MICHAEL L. 
) WILSON 
) Civil No. 100921025 
) Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
DECLARATION 
MICHAEL L. WILSON, states as follows: 
. 1. I am over the age of 21 years and have personal knowledge of the facts stated in 
this declaration. 
2. I am the General Manager of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & 
Sandy. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3. I have never received a telephone call or a voice mail from Mr. Zdenek Sorf. 
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing Declaration is true 
and correct 
-art 
EXECUTED this / " d a y of February, 2010. 
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I 
SHAWN E. DRANEY (4026) 
SCOTT R MARTIN (7750) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTTNEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11* Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Facsimile: (801)363-0400 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT ; 
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) DECLARATION OF WAYNE WINSOR 
) CivilNo. 100921025 
) Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
i 
DECLARATION 
WAYNE WINSOR, states as follows: 
1. I am over the age of 21 years and have personal knowledge of the facts stated in 
this declaration. 
2. I am the Engineering Manager of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & 
Sandy. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3. I have never received a telephone call or a voice mail from Mr. Zdenek Sorf. 
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing Declaration is true 
and correct 
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I 
SHAWN E. DRANEY (4026) 
SCOTT H. MARTIN (7750) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTTNEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Facsimile: (801)363-0400 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT ] 
• OF SALT LAKE & SANDY, ; 
Plainth% ) 
v. ] 
ZDENEKSORF, • ] 
Defendant. ] 
) DECLARATION OF 
) RYANNICHOLES 
) Civil No. 100921025 
) Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
RYAN NICHOLES, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that: 
1. I am over the age of 21 years and have personal knowledge of the facts stated in 
this declaration. 
2. I am the IT Supervisor at the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
("MWDSLS") and have been since February, 2003. 
3. OnFebmaryl*,2011,I was asked to determine what records might be available 
evidencing telephone calls received by MWDSLS from 801-301-1160 or 801-531-9944, the 
telephone numbers provided to MWDSLS personnel by the plaintiff, I checked all incoming 
telephone calls as far back as the systems would allow, between December 3,2010 through 
January .31, .2011, and found neither of the plaintiff s telephone numbers in the 13 8 pages of calls 
received by MWDSLS during that time period. 
4. I was able to document all incoming calls to all MWDSLS telephone lines, 
including MWDSLS' General Manager, Michael Wilson, and MWDSLS' Engineering Manager, 
Wayne Winsor, whose telephone numbers had been provided to the plaintiff. A printout of the 
call information with regard to Mr. Wilson's telephone line ("631") is attached at Exhibit A. A 
printout of that call information to Mr. Winsor's telephone line ("685") is attached at Exhibit B. 
5. I found no incoming calls from the numbers provided by the plaintiff from 
December 3, 2010 to January 31,2011, whether to the MWDSLS systems generally, or to the 
General Manager or the Engineering Manager5 s telephone lines. 
DATED this j7_ day of February, 2011. 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this J7_ day of February, 2011. 
%
. • " * - * " — * * ' * > ^ ^ ~ * * > ^ * > ^ * > * * + . ^ 
ANNALEE MUNSEY f 
Notary Public V 
State of Utah F 
My Commission Expires May 7, 2011 k 
3430 E Danish Rd, Sandy, UT B4093 I 
i i u 9 I W F ^ ^ P I u M * i " y « y ^ r ¥ ^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CfUt^Z 
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12/23/10 9:40 AM 
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12/23/10 4:11PM 
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12/23/10 4:23 PM 
12/27A08:46AM 
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12/22/10 8 3 9 AM 
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12/31/69 5:00 PM 
12/14/10 4:16 PM 
12/15/10 8 3 1 AM 
12/15/10 8 3 2 AM 
12/15/10 9:26 AM 
12/31/69 5:00 PM 
12/15/10 9:48 AM 
12/31/69 5:00 PM 
12/15/10 633 PM 
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12/15/10 9:47 AM 
12/15A0 9:48 AM 
12/15/1010:21 AM 
12/15/10 6 3 4 PM 
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12/20/10 8:03 AM 
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12/21A0 11:18 AM 
12/22/10 8 2 8 AM 
12/22/10 8 3 0 AM 
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I. \ 
SHAWN E. DRANEY (4026) 
SCOTT H. MARTIN (7750) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Facsimile: (801)363-0400 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT 
OF SALT LAKE & SANDY, 
) APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF 
Plaintiff, ) DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
v. ) 
) Civil No. 100921025 
ZDENEK SORF, ) 
) Judge Fratto 
Defendant. ) 
Pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), Utah R. Civ. P., Plaintiff, Metropolitan Water District of Salt 
Lake & Sandy ("MWDSLS"), hereby applies for entry of Default Judgment against Defendant 
Zdenek Sorf ("Defendant"), in the form submitted herewith, by the Court, based on the 
following: 
1. Defendant was personally served with Summons and Complaint on October 28, 
2010. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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i 
2. Defendant has failed to respond to MWDSLS's Complaint or otherwise appear in 
this action. 
3. Defendant is not an infant nor incompetent person, nor in the armed forces within 
the meaning of the Service Member's Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 520(1). 
4. The relief requested by MWDSLS in its Complaint can be readily ascertained and 
awarded in a Default Judgment of this Court, in the form submitted herewith. 
WHEREFORE, having satisfied the requirements of Rule 55(b)(2), Plaintiff requests that 
Default Judgment be entered by the Court, in the form submitted herewith. 
/$£ 
DATED this / ^ f December, 2010 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
<^T~?. 
Shawn E. Draney 
Scott H. Martin 
Attorneys for Plaintiff MWDSLS 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I state that I served the attached APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an 
envelope and causing the same to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid to: 
Mr. Zdenek Sorf 
9625 South Mount Jordan Road 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
tfr-
DATED this \ y day of December, 2010. 
16002-62 1592929 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM 10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SHAWN E. DRANEY (4026) 
SCOTT H. MARTIN (7750) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Facsimile: (801) 363-0400 




m 17 20I| 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Senuty Cferk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT ) 
OF SALT LAKE & SANDY, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
v. 
ZDENEK SORF, ; 
Defendant. 
) [PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET 
) ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 100921025 
) Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment ("Motion") came before the Court on 
March 8, 2011 at 2:30 p.m. 
Defendant Zdenek Sorf appeared through counsel, Paul M. Belnap. 
Plaintiff Meiropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy appeared through counsel, 
Shawn E. Draney and Scott H. Martin. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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( 
Based on the written submissions of the parties and oral argument presented, the Court 
orders as follows: 
1. Based on the Court's finding that Defendant was properly served with the 
Complaint and Summons, that Defendant has not made an adequate showing of excusable 
neglect, mistake, or inadvertence in his failure to respond to the Complaint, and that those 
defenses proffered by Defendant to Plaintiffs Complaint are not meritorious as a matter of law 
under the circumstances given Plaintiffs defined easement, its prior federal ownership, and 
Plaintiffs status as a political subdivision of the state, the Court hereby denies Defendant's 
Motion, 
2. The Default Judgment entered December 13, 2010 by this Court remains in full 
force and effect. 
SO ORDERED this IT day of March, 2C 
& 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I state that I served the attached [PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT upon the party listed below by placing a 
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and causing the same to be mailed via first class 
U.S. Mail to: 
Paul Belnap 
Bradley Wm. Bowen 
Casey W. Jones 
Strong & Hanni 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Zdenek Sorf 
A DATED this /r day of March, 2011. 
16002-62 1687687vl 
3 
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$8 
PROOF OF SERVICE ^ 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT , _tr„, p _ ^ _ 
) CASE NO: 100921025 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ) 
I, Mel B. Ashton hereby certify under the penalties of perjury and in accordance with the provisions set forth by 
the State of Utah, Section 78B-5-705 the following: 
I am a citizen of the United States over the age of 18 years at the time of service herein, and am not a party to or 
have an interest in the within action. 
I received the attached Default Judgment on December 17,2010 and served the same on December 23,2010 at 
1:09 p.m. on ZdenekZorfbv serving his wife, Mrs. Zorf at 9625 South Mount Jordan Road, Sandy, Utah 84092. 
She answered the door and I said Mrs. Zorf and she said "yes." I showed her the Default Judgment and told her I 
was serving her. She said "no" and slammed the door. The service was in the door. She is a white female, about 45 
years old, brown shoulder length hair, 5'5" tall and 120 pounds. 
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing-is true and correct. _ _ 
I further certify that at the time of service I endorsed the date and time of service and added my name thereto. 
Dated this cMlay of December, 2010 
1?Ut& 6UArd 
Mel B. Ashton, DPS Gl 00001 
A. A. & Associates, Inc. 
P.O. Box 964 
Sandy, Utah 84091 
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SHAWN E. DRANEY (4026) 
SCOTT H.MARTIN (7750) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Facsimile: (801)363-0400 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By. 
Deputy Clerk 
Serve Defendant at: 
Mr. Zdenek Sorf 
9625 South Mount Jordan Road 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT ) 





I DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 100921025 
) Judge Fratto 
Due to Defendant Zdenek Sorf s ("Defendant") failure to appear and plead or otherwise 
defend in this action, default judgment is hereby entered as follows: 
It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiff Metropolitan Water 
District of Salt Lake & Sandy ("MWDSLS") is granted judgment against Defendant, as follows: 
1. Not later than twenty (20) calendar days after the entry of this Judgment and 
sendee of the same upon Defendant, Defendant shall remove all improvements that Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
encroach on that portion of MWDSLS's Tract 417 of the Salt Lake Aqueduct ("SLA") 
corridor ("SLA Corridor") which crosses Defendant's Property (9625 South Mt. Jordan 
Road (at 2550 East) Sandy, Utah) as follows: 
a. Defendant shall remove all encroachments not authorized by MWDSLS, 
including, but not limited to, rock retaining walls, added fill material, gazebo, hot tub, 
two (2) outbuildings, trees, and water features. 
b. Defendant shall return adequate soils and fill (25 to 3' in depth) on the 
south portion of Defendant's Property traversed by the SLA. 
_. c:? MWDSLS sl^l be given not les 
before the work begins. 
d. MWDSLS shall have the right to observe and inspect all work performed 
by or on behalf of Defendant, and direct the work as necessary to reasonably mitigate risk 
to the SLA and related facilities. 
e. The work will be completed consistent with applicable MWDSLS 
regulations. 
f. Defendant will immediately remove all impediments to access to the SLA 
corridor by MWDSLS and its contractor(s). This will be accomplished by installing (at a 
minimum) access gates with openings not less than 12 feet in width on the north and 
south property lines. If Defendant desires to have a lock on the gate, he shall make 
arrangements acceptable to MWDSLS for locks in series and allow MWDSLS to place 
their own lock, such that MWDSLS has access to the SLA corridor at all times. Digitized by t e Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
2. If Defendant fails to fully comply with Paragraph 1 immediately above, 
MWDSLS, or MWDSLS' contractor, may move and remove all described encroaching 
improvements, and Defendant is hereby enjoined from interfering with such work. MWDSLS 
may seek additional judgment or judgments for any costs incurred as a result of Defendant's 
i 
failure to fully comply with paragraph 1 above. 
3. For that portion of Defendant's home that is located within the SLA Corridor, 
Defendant shall enter a standard cooperation agreement with MWDSLS allowing for the home's 
continued occupation of the SLA Corridor. 
_ 4. _ ..Defendant is hereby enjoined from any future trespass upon MWDSLS property 
interests in the SLA across or adjoining Defendant's Property, and all violations of MWDSLS 
regulations regarding the SLA. 
ENTERED this \r) day of December, 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge Fratto 
S 
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GARY U . OTT 
RECORDER, SALT LAKE CDUHTf, UTAH 
METRQFaiTflH WATER DIST OF SL 
3430 E DANISH RD 
9AHDY UT 84093 
* BM ZJftt DEPUTf - HI ISO P. 
(Quitclaim Deed No. 1 under Contract No. 04-WC-40-8950) 
QUITCLAIM DEED 
(Salt Lake Aqueduct, Salt Lake County Lands) 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMEMCA (Grantor), acting by and throiigh'the Bureau of 
Reclamation, Department of the Interior, pursuant to the provisions of the Act of June 17,1902 
(32.Stat. 388), and acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto, particularly the Provo River 
Project Transfer Act (Public Law 108-382,118 Stat. 2212). hereby quitclaims and conveys to* 
METROPOLITAN WATEf . DISTRICT OF SALr LAKE & SANDY (Grantee), a political 
subdivision of the State-of Utah, 3430 East Danish Road. Cottonwood Heights, Utah 84093, for* 
Ten Dollars (SI'0.00) and Other good tod valuable'consideration, all of Grantor's right, title and 
interest in and to lands and interests in lands located in Salt Lake Coun1yv Utah, commonly 
referred to as the Salt Lake Aqueduct more particularly described in Exhibit A, attached .and by 
this reference made a part hereof. 
lOCiEJHEK 
located h\ under or upon -such lands or interests in lands. . 
TOGETHER WITH the rights, privileges, duties, obligations, and responsibilities of the Grantor 
which exist, as of the date of this Quitclaim Deed, as a result of any. valid right^of-use agreements 
catered, by. Grantor. The Grantee, shall honor the terms of each such right-of-use agreement, as 
de^ribei m-the Provo River Project Transfer Act and Contract No. 04-WC-40-8950, dated*" 
November^ 3*2004. 
ALL OF THE ABOVS described lands or interests in lands, facilities, equipment, improvstnents, 
Extures. features, and appurtenances are hereinafter collectively referred to as. the "Real Property''. 
This Quitpiaiin Deed shall be interpreted as conveying all of Grantor's interest, present.and future, 
in all lands, interests in lands, facilities, equipment, improvements, fixtures, features and 
appurtenances that in anywise are a pail of or essential to the ownership, operation, or 
maintenance of the Aqueduct Division of the Provo River Project lying or located within Salt Lake 
Coilnty. Utah, whether acquired or constructed by or for Grantor, ar-acquired or constructed by or 
"for Grantee, or constructed by or for otherspursuant to righi-ofruse agreements, except as 
expressly excluded or reserved below. 
THIS CONVEYANCE DOES NOT INCLUDE OR MODIFY: 
1, .Any interest in or to any National Forest system lands crossed by the Salt Lake 
Aqueduct As to such lands, Grantor shall convey to Grantee, by separate instrument an 
appropriately sized, permanent easement for the use, operation, maintenance, repair, improvement 
When recorded return to. ' 
Snow, Christensen &.'Martineau 
Attn: Shavm'E. Draney 
10 Exchange -Place 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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and replacement of fh£ Salt Lake Aqueduct, as described in the Provo River Project Transfer Act 
and Contract No. 04-WC-40-8950. 
2. Any interests in water rights or rights to use water.
 x , 
3. Any oil, gas or other mineral rights or interests held in the name of the United States; 
.provided, ho wever3-that any future exploration for oil, gas or other Federally owned minerals or 
minerals rights or interests underlying the Real Property shall be conducted in such, a manner as 
will not compromise the structural integrity of, or interfere with the use, operation, maintenance, 
repair or replacement of, the Salt Lake Aqueduct, or related facilities, equipment, improvements, 
• fixtures, features or appurtenances; provided further tihat no surface occupancy for exploration'or 
exploitation of oil, gas, or other Federally owned mineral? rights or interests shall be allowed on 
the Real Property, 
. THIS CONVEYANCE IS SUBJECT TO: 
1. Oil, gas.,, and other mineral rights reserved of record by or in favor of third-parties as of 
the date of this Quitclaim Deed. 
2. Valid permits, licenses, leases, rights-or-use, or rights-of-way of record or outstanding 
on, over, or across Ihc Real Property in existence on the date of this Quitclaim Deed. 
3.' Aperpetud easement reserved by Grantor on, over, or across theJRealProperty to. 
provide for lawfol continued non-motorized public access to and across the Real Property for 
recreational purposes; provided that such non-motorized public use shall not interfere with the use, 
operation, maintenance, repair, improvement, replacement or protection of the Salt Lake Aqueduct 
and related facilities, equipment, improvements, fixtures, features and appurtenances, and such 
non-motorized public use shall be subject to all existing and future state, federal, local and Grantee 
statutes, rules, regulations, ordinances, policies and procedures regarding safety and security. 
4. Title to any equipment, improvements, fixtures, features and appurtenances which axe 
part of the Provo River Project, Utah, Deer Creek Division, is hereby reserved to the Grantor. ' 
5. Title to any equipment, improvements, fixtures, features and appurtenances which are . 
part of the Central Utah Project is hereby reserved to the Grantor. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN Hiat: 
1. Acting pursuant to the requirements of 40 CFR 373, on April 23, May 3, and May 18, 
2006, the Grantor performed a hazardous waste survey of the Real Property, and a copy of said 
survey was .delivered to the Grantee in a letter dated September 26,2006. The Real Property 
conveyed herein to the Grantee is being conveyed in the same condition as existed on the date of 
. said survey and which is more particularly described in that survey. No remediation by the 
Grantor on behalf of the Grantee has been or will be made. 
2. The Grantee has used, and has had operation and maintenance responsibility for the 
Real Property for over 50 years. Grantee and its successors and assigns accept the Real Property 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"as is" and also accept liability for the Real Property from the date of this Quitclaim Deed 
forward. 
3. The Grantee, its successors and assigns shall be responsible for the protection, 
identification, and preservation of cultural resources, if any, located on the Real Property as 
required by the existing and future laws of the State of Utah. 
4. Nothing in this Quitclaim Deed shall be construed as including the quitclaim, 
abandonment, forfeiture, or relinquishment by the Grantor of its basic patent right reserved by the 
Act of August 30,1890 (26 Stat. 391) as to the described lands for easements claimed, or to be 
claimed, for purposes other than the Salt Lake Aqueduct; j 
5. Nothing in this Quitclaim Deed shall be construed or interpreted as altering or 
amending the terms or conditions of any United "States-contract, or supplements or' amendments 
thereto, except as specifically provided in Article 20 of Contract No. 04-WC-40-8950, dated 
November 23, 2004. 
6. If any further specific conveyances-should be necessary .hereafter, because of the 
discovery *of additional Real Property not listed on the Exhibits, to more specifically and legally 
describe the Real Property, or because the Grantor acquires any title to or interest in the Salt Lake 
Aqueduct by reason of an'instrument in the Grantor's chain of title, or by operation of law, then 
Grantor:shall make reasonable efforts to provide such conveyances, on the same terms and 
^, conditions set forth above. _ - • _ _ _ 
7, Nothing in this Quitclaim Deed shall be construed or interpreted as creating any 
. condition subsequent, reverter, or possibility of a reverter. 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto Grantee, and Grantee's successors and assigns, the Real 
Property; together with all the rights and appurtenances thereto in anywise belonging, forever. 
WITNESS the hand of the Grantor this 2nd day of October, 2006. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Regional Director, Upper Colorado Region 
Bureau of Reclamation 
Acting for the Secretary of Interior 
of the United States 
Approved: 
tSice of <&e Regional Solicitor 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
On this 2nd "day of October, 2006, personally appeared before me, Rick L. Gold, known to me to be 
the Regional Director of the Bureau of Reclamation, Upper Colorado Region, United States 
Department of the Interior, the signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that 
he executed the same on behalf of THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, pursuant to authority 
delegated ts him from the Secretary of the Interior. 
(NOTARY SEAL) Notary Public in and for the State of Utah 
Residing at: Cfi^^r^l-^ 
^ PAULINE P BROWN 
% fSJWr^ Wjaft'OTBf «0»HI 
•:'», -sea £*$* im SOUTH I 
' * WtfWO, VTfth &4W6J 
CGEMEXF. 06-07-2010 
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ACCEPTANCE 
The parties intend for the above Quitclaim Deed to satisfy a portion of the terms of Contract No. 
04-WC-40-8950, dated November 23,2004!, and a portion of the requirements of Public Law 108-
382. The Grantee accepts this Quitclaim Deed on the terms and conditions stated herein. The 
Giantee hereby farther agrees and acknowledges' that: (1) the Salt Lake Aqueduct shall no longer 
be regarded or treated either as a Provo River Project or a United States facility, except with 
regard to Provo River Project water as provided for in Section 17 of Contact No. 04-WG40-
8950, dated November 23,2004; the Grantee shall not be entitled to receive any future 
Reclamation benefits with respect to the Real Property, except for benefits that would be available 
to other non-Reclamation facilities; and (3) to the fullest extent allowed by law, the Grantee agrees 
to indemnify and hold harmless the Grantor, its officers and employees from any claims, liabilities 
or other responsibilities which may arise subsequent to the date of this Quitclaim Deed which 
result from the Grantee's .use, operation, or maintenance of the Real Property as described in this 
Quitclaim Deed. 
*N 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT 
QF SALT LAKE. & SANDY 
lael L. Wilson, General Manager 
Approved: 
i. Draney, 
Counsel Jfor Metropolitan W&er District of Salt Lake & Sandy 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
STATE OF UTAH . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
:ss. 
On this 2nd day of October, 20069 personally appeared before me, Michael L." Wilson, known to me 
to be the General Manager of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy, the signer of 
the above instrument who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same on behalf of 
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy, pursuant to authority delegated to him from the 
Board of Trustees of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy. 





-Notary Public iii ami fur ttorState of Utah 
Residing at: 
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Rf*ujti*r«. rv.*w U&fcsgowits/ ut,ah 
• wugrtm' DEEP or Mmflfflfr %r3 gagey'^y^ne^s. I 
KErROPOIIUH WATER liltfTrliT Of liaLT UKE CBCTX, A metropolitan water district * ^ * 
organised and existing under ane* by jrirtue of the l a w of the Stats of $teh| 
with i t s principal place of -business at Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, Qrantor> hereby conveys and warrants to THE UNITED STATES OF 
XMfe&ICAj acting pursuant **? the provisions of the Xot of JUHB 17, 1902 (32 
3tat i , 388), and act A a&endatory thereof or supplementary thereto ^ (irsatee, 
for the KW of T«D Hundred Twenty and 75/lOD (J220>7£) Dollars 
k perpetual easement to construct and reconstructj operate and 
njaintain an underground 'jSipe i^nB and. appurtenant structures, 
which latter mity be situated above ground surface', oil, over or 
across the following described property situated, in Salt Lake 
County,, State of Utahi 
A stripy of land in the South Half of the Southeast Quarter of 
the Uortheast Qoartur (SjSEsNEi.) of Section Tea (10) > Township 
Three (3) South, Range One ( l ) Eastf Salt Lake Bass and Heridianj 
One Hundred Twenty-five (125) feet wide and included between two 
lines extended to M:.« properly lineB end everywhere^distant 
Seventy-five (75) feet Host or to t i e l e f t sad Fifty ( 5 0 ) f e e * - -
East or .to the light or the following described, center lino of 
vhat i s kicwn as the Salt Lake/aqusdpot from Station 1679+33 
to Station lbSo+15 measured -at right angles &nd/or radially 
thereto, Said center line i s more particularly desorlbed aa 
follows\ 
Beginning at Station 1679+83 a point on the South Hue of the 
Orantci^s property in said Section 10» from Mhleh point the 
Northeast corner of said Section 10 l i e s North Twenty-aix Hundred 
ISfimty-Feven and one-tenth (2o27,l) feet and East Seven Hundred 
S iveirty-five and E.ght~tenths (7?5t6) feet , more or laasj and 
running thenoe North 7*!!.1 Bast Si* Hundred Thirty-two (632.) feat,. 
more or lees* to Station 16&&&5 of said Aqueduct center line., a 
point on the Korth Una of:the Qrantor'a property> from \faich. point 
the Northeast 'corner of said Section 10 l i e s Horth Twenty Hundred 
*n& one-tenth '(2000*1) feat and. East Six Hundred .Hinety^-six and 
Eight-tenths (69c-»8) 'feet, mere or lass j containing 1*61 acres, 
more or Issa, 
aleoi a s tr ip of lane" in the North Half of the Southeast Quarter 
of the northeast Quarter (ffiSB^j) of Section Tea (10), Township * 
Three (3) South, Bange One (1) East, Salt Lake Base end Meridian, 
One Hundred Twenty^five (125) fast vide and included between two 
l ines extended to the property l ines and eTfiryvber© distant Ssrant^ 
fi-wb (?5) laat "Heat or to the left and ELfty (50) feet East or to 
the right of the following described center l ine of. -what i s )ctonm , 
as the Bait'lake aqueduct froia. Station 1684+15 to .Station 1692+fc, 
Toaasursd at right angles and/or radially 'tkerBto* Said cents* Una 
i s iBore particularly described as follows* - • .' .^  
" vi•4^ :^?5 /v^ ,^ , 
^ j j w p r £ W JfT*'^*XVtt®#M 7Z&
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Beginndag at Stat ion 1686*15 * point on the South Una of the Grantor*a 
property In e.aid Section 10,* from which paint the Northeast c o m e r of 
said Ssot ion 10 l i n e a Korth Twenty* Hundred and Qne-tanth (200Q»1) 5 e e t 
and East S i x Hundred Ninety-aix and El^i-tenfchs (696.8) f e e t , more 
o r l«»saj and ronnin* thence North f*ll* East Three Hundred Hine and 
Eight-tenths (309 I8J f ee t j thence on a regular curve to the r ight 
having a radiuB of Sixteen Hundred (1600) f e e t , and a distance of 
One Hundred Twenty and One-tenth (120.1) f e e t , aa measured on t h e 
a r , of the curve; thence Korth 11*29f East T*o Hundred Thirty-seven 
ei\d One-tenth (237 i l ) f*ofc to Station 1692+82 of a&id-Aqueduct center 
U n a , a point on the North line" oC the Grantor's property, from *ft&ch 
point the Northeast corner of eoid Section 10 l i e s Korth Thirteen Hun-
dred Forty-one and Rlne^tenthn (1341.9) f e t and East Five Hundred 
Hinety-one and Four-tenths (591*4) f*»ct. mora or lean; containing 1.57 
acres , more or l e a s . 
The t o t a l area of the above-deacribed tracts i s 3«3S acres , wore or l a e a * 
IN Vj33!KE5S VKEE3^  cauaed thia deed t o he signed by i t s 
Chairman of the Board, of Directors *nd it.a corporate seal to be' a f f i x e d ~ 
there to thia 22nd day of Augu-Bt , 1?$?.. 
KB2?RQPaUITA^ATa!v.^IJTRia, OP SALT LAKE CITT 
'. 'S-ft&m 
*?°* \V^^L) Chnirniftno? i ts ^oardf'oT&mctc'-a 
secretary ^ 
SEATB OF UTAH 
COUKTX OF SALT LA1CE 
On the 22nd day of August* 
George !?• Snyder 
, 1952, paraqrwlly appeared, before me, 
*ho# heing duly' sworn by tte> • did aay t h a t he i s the 
Chairman of tha Board of Directors of the Metropolitan' Vfater Distri'ot of S a l t Laka 
City* end that aa id inatruneut was signed i » behalf of said D i s t r i c t pursuant to 
authority of a reso lut ion of i t s Board of Directors, and aaid 
George v» Bnyder acknowledged t o me 'that said d i s t r i c t executed the asme* 
Qr?**~**+—*>L 
**-4 
Notary Public, Rosidin^ at Salt Lake 
City, County of Salt Late, State of 
Utah. 
sion .Expires i 
"" 1952 , 
•"•vsfen. ^ ftfr&fc. um • W 
k^i*. •••:*>•" 
«5&.5 
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Paul M. Belnap, #0279 
Bradley Wm. Bowen, #5042 
Casey W.Jones, #12133 
STRONG & HANNI 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
Facsimile: (801) 596-1508 
pbelnap(g),stron gandhanni. com 
bbowen(g),strongandhanni.com 
ci ones@strongandhanni. com 
Attorneys for Defendant Zdenek Sorf 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATEOFUTAH 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF 







Civil No.: 100921025 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
Defendant and Counterclaimant, Zdenek Sorf, by and through counsel, alleges as 
follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Zdenek Sorf is an individual residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy ("District") is an independent 
political subdivision of the State of Utah with offices located in Salt Lake County. 
3. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-5-102 and 78B-
3-205. 
4. Venue is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-301(l), as the real 
property that is the subject matter of this action is located in Salt Lake County. 
FACTS AND GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
5. The Salt Lake Aqueduct ("SLA") is part of the public water delivery 
infrastructure in Salt Lake City and County. 
6. The SLA corridor consists of easement and fee lands purportedly held by the 
District. 
7. Mr. Sorf owns the residence at 9625 S, Mount Jordan Road in Sandy, Utah. 
8. Mr. Sorf has lived in his residence for nearly 24 years. The SLA easement 
covers the majority of Mr. Sorf s backyard and even extends into the southeast corner of his 
home. 
9. Mr. Sorf has spent nearly $150,000 improving, designing and developing his 
backyard landscaping. 
10. A default j udgment was entered against Mr. Sorf on December 13,2010. 
11. In light of the default judgment, the District is demanding Mr. Sorf permanently 
remove, at his expense, all structures that sit on or near the SLA easement in his backyard 
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I 
including, but not limited to, rock retaining walls, added fill material, gazebo, hot tub, two (2) 
outbuildings, trees, and water features. 
12. In light of the default judgment, the District is also demanding Mr. Sorf, at his 
expense, return adequate soils and fill (2' to 3' in depth) on the south portion of his property 
traversed by the SLA. 
13. In light of the default judgment, the District required Mr. Sorf to install gates 
with openings not less than 12 feet in width on the north and south property lines. The purpose 
of the gates is to create an access point for the District, and its contractors, to access the SLA 
corridor pursuant to their discretion. 
14. As a condition of using the property within the easement, the District, through 
the default judgment, is requiring Mr. Sorf to enter an agreement entitled "Cooperation 
Agreement" (hereinafter "Agreement") that restricts and regulates the use of Mr. Sorf s property 
and what can be done with the property. 
15. Under the Agreement, the District is requiring that various structures on Mr. 
Sorf s property be permanently removed (i.e. added fill material, turf areas, rock retaining walls, 
fencing and access gates, flat work, concrete and rock pathways, garden boxes, an electrical 
utility line, a motorcycle barn, an equipment shed, a gazebo and hot tub, deck, water feature, and 
trees within the SLA corridor), and is precluding the construction of future improvements 
without first receiving written permission from the District. 
16. The southeast corner of Mr. Sorf s home encroaches approximately 4.3 feet 
onto the SLA corridor. The District requires that for the encroaching portion of Mr. Sorf s home 
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to remain in place. Mr. Sorf must enter the Agreement and the terms of the Agreement must 
remain in effect. 
17. The District, in the Agreement, prohibits Mr. Sorf from performing any work on 
the portion of his property that is within or close to the SLA corridor without approval from the 
District. 
18. Any work performed by Mr. Sorf on the areas of his property within or close to 
the SLA Corridor must be consistent with construction standards set by the District. 
19. The District retains authority to stop work and require correction of any work, 
or replacement of any materials, on Mr. Sorf s property which in its reasonable judgment does 
not comply with any term or condition of the Agreement. 
20. In the event the District desires to have improvements on Mr. Sorf s property 
inspected by a qualified professional, Mr. Sorf is obligated to reimburse the District for the cost 
of such an inspection. 
21. If the District modifies or destroys any of the improvements installed on Mr. 
Sorf s property that are within or in close proximity to the SLA corridor, Mr. Sorf must 
personally bear the financial implications of such actions. 
22. The Agreement is only good for five (5) years and has a maximum duration of 
fifteen (15) years. Renewal of the Agreement is not guaranteed. 
23. The Agreement can be terminated, for any reason, at the discretion of either 
party. 
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24. If a new agreement is not entered before the Agreement's expiration, Mr. Sorf s 
right to use his property, including the portion of his house that falls within the SLA corridor, 
could be terminated. 
25. If the Agreement is terminated, Mr. Sorf will be expected to remove any 
improvements made to the SLA corridor, restore the SLA corridor according to District's 
specifications, and reimburse the District for any costs owed. 
26. In any dispute relating to the Agreement, the District will not be liable for 
consequential damages to Mr. Sorf even if the District is found to be at fault. 
27. Any rights given to Mr. Sorf in relation to use of the SLA corridor cannot be 
assigned or transferred without prior written consent of the District. The District is under no 
obligation to approve an assignment or transfer of Mr. Sorf s rights. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Inverse Condemnation 
28. Mr. Sorf incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully stated herein. 
29. Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides, "Private property shall 
not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." 
30. Mr. Sorf owns the property located at 9625 S. Mount Jordan Way. 
31. Mr. Sorf has protectable interests in his property and has the right to just 
compensation when his property is taken for public use. 
32. A default judgment was entered against Mr. Sorf on December 13, 2010. 
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33. The default judgment demands Mr. Sorf remove, at his expense, extensive 
landscaping and multiple physical structures from his property. 
34. The default judgment restricts and otherwise limits the ways in which Mr. Sorf 
can use, develop and maintain his property. 
3 5. The default judgment demands Mr. Sorf enter an Agreement with the District so 
that the southeast corner of his home can continue to occupy the SLA corridor. The Agreement 
gives the District further authority to regulate and restrict the usage of Mr. Sorf s property. 
36. The default judgment obtained by the District and the restrictions and 
regulations being imposed on Mr. Sorf s property are for a public use, i.e. to provide water to the 
Salt Lake Valley and Salt Lake County. 
37. The effect of the default judgment, in addition to the restrictions and regulations 
imposed by the District in relation to Mr. Sorf s property, foreclose any feasible option for Mr. 
Sorf to use his property. 
38. The effect of the default judgment, in addition to the restrictions and regulations 
imposed by the District in relation to Mr. Sorf s property, have eliminated any economically 
viable use of Mr. Sorf s property. 
39. When considering the actions of the District in this matter through the default 
judgment and the restrictions and regulations being imposed on Mr. Sorf s property, the 
character of the governmental actions, the economic impact of these actions on Mr. Sorf, and the 
extent to which the regulatory actions have interfered with Mr. Sorf s use and enjoyment of his 
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property, constitute a taking of protected property interests for a public purpose for which just 
compensation must be paid. 
40. The District's actions through the default judgment and the restrictions and 
regulations being imposed on Mr. Sorfs property constitute the inverse condemnation of Mr. 
Sorfs property and a regulatory taking for which Mr. Sorf is entitled to just compensation from 
the District, in an amount to be determined at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Sorf demands judgment as follows: 
A. Mr. Sorf is entitled to an order declaring that the District's actions 
constitute the inverse condemnation of Mr. Sorfs property and a regulatory taking for which Mr. 
Sorf is entitled to just compensation from the District in an amount to be determined at trial; and 
B. Mr. Sorf is entitled to an award from the District of his costs of Court, 
attorney fees and such other relief as the Court deems just. 
JURY DEMAND 
Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Sorf hereby demands a 
jury on all issues triable to a jury and submits the statutory fee. 
DATED this day of April, 2011. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By 
Paul M. Belnap 
Bradley Wm. Bowen 
Casey W. Jones 
Attorneys for Zdenek Sorf 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I herby certify that on this day of April, 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM (PROPOSED) and a copy of this Certificate 
of Service wsre served by the method indicated below to the following: 
Shawn E. Draney 
Scott H. Martin 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P. 0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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